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Children’s understanding of the mind and mental states has been studied 
extensively by Theory of Mind researchers. Important aspects of understanding the mind 
involve general beliefs about what the mind is, what it can do, and what sort of entities 
have minds. In two studies I investigated the types of attributes children and adults 
believe an object or entity must have in order to claim that the object or entity has a mind. 
In Study 1, children and adults were asked about physical, mental and emotional 
characteristics of a number of entities, including intelligent artifacts (e.g., robots and 
computers), social entities (e.g., people and animals) and inanimate objects (e.g., 
flowers).  They were also asked whether each of these entities is alive, and whether each 
has a mind, brain and heart.  Adults were asked the same questions in the form of a 
questionnaire.  Similarities and differences between how social entities, intelligent 
artifacts and inanimate objects are conceptualized were evaluated.  Specifically, patterns 
of responses were analyzed to determine which characteristics are most strongly 
 vii
associated with having a mind and a brain. The presence of a mind was most strongly 
associated with emotion, physical states, intentional behavior, advanced mental states, 
senses and sensations. The brain was most strongly associated with senses, sensations, 
physical states, intentional behavior, basic mental acts and advanced mental acts.  In 
Study 2, children were presented with twelve unfamiliar “people, animals or things,” 
each of which was presented as having between one and three mind-related 
characteristics (cognitive, emotional, and interactive). For example, they may have been 
told that a mippit can think (cognitive) and feel happy (emotional).  Children were asked 
whether each entity is alive, and whether each has a mind, brain and heart.  Patterns of 
responses were analyzed to determine which attributes are most strongly associated with 
having a mind and a brain. It was found that children consider cognition, emotion and 
interaction as indicators of the presence of a mind and brain 
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INTRODUCTION 
The nature of the human mind has long been a subject of philosophical discourse 
and psychological inquiry.  Interest in the mind and its capabilities, however, has not 
been limited solely to the humanities and social sciences.  The “mystery” of the mind has 
permeated the thoughts of humankind so much that it has become an important issue in a 
wide range of fields.  Researchers in biology, artificial intelligence, human-computer 
interaction and other areas are increasingly focusing on issues related to the mind (see 
Scassellati, 2000, 2001; Bracken, 2000; Ramachandran & Blakeslee, 1998).  It is not 
surprising that the nature of the mind generates so much interest in intellectual endeavors 
in so many different areas.   
Both in the classroom and in the media, the mind is strongly associated with 
intellectual achievement and cognitive advancement.  The ability to understand the 
driving force behind that achievement, and even trying to duplicate it, can be considered 
a motivating force in the advancement of our society.  Fascination with understanding the 
mind, however, seems to go much deeper than this surface level advancement.  The 
answers to questions about the nature of the mind are particularly significant in that they 
provide insight into people as humans, and mental beings. People are, after all, defined by 
the mind; what we do, what we think and how we perceive ourselves are intricately 
intertwined with our conception of the mind.  Understanding of the mind is also critical to 
being able to function effectively in the world.  Not only is a conception of the mind and 
its abilities used to successfully deal with other social beings, it is often used to help 
understand objects or entities that exhibit mind-like capabilities, such as computers.  
Whether or not a mind or mind-like properties are attributed to something (or someone) 
can have profound effects on how one interprets and interacts with that thing (Dennett, 
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1987). This is particularly true when making the distinction between having a mind and a 
brain.  In Western culture, important moral, religious, and legal decisions revolve around 
whether an entity is believed to have a mind, as opposed to only a brain. For example, 
issues such as the timing and appropriateness of abortion and euthanasia rely upon 
people’s perceptions of the entity in question. No one would argue whether a person in a 
coma has a brain, but whether that person has a mind is a more controversial matter that 
is more +central to the issue of euthanasia. The mind/brain question is also of import in 
other areas of people’s lives. How should different types of entities be treated? Is an 
animal responsible for its own behavior? What about a highly advanced robot? Should 
these entities be punished for their misdeeds, and if so, what punishment is appropriate? 
These and similar questions underscore the need to have greater insight into how people 
view the mind and the brain. 
Given the importance of our  conception of the mind, it is not surprising that there 
is a considerable body of psychological research investigating the development of 
children’s naïve understanding of the mind, or Theory of Mind (see Astington & Gopnik, 
1991).  Theory of Mind researchers have constructed comprehensive theories about the 
development of children’s understanding of various mental states such as desires, beliefs, 
imagination and pretense (Flavell, 1988; Perner, 1991; Wellman, 1990; Woolley, 1995).  
Understanding of mental states is very pertinent to understanding of the mind, as the 
presence of mental state capabilities is often implicitly seen as synonymous with having a 
mind.   
Although Theory of Mind research provides valuable information about 
understanding of the mind, its focus has been on children’s understanding of specific 
mental states like desires and beliefs.  However, understanding the mind also involves 
having more general beliefs about what the mind is, what it can do, and what sort of 
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entities have minds.  To date, there is not a comprehensive overview of development in 
children’s and adults’ conception of the mind itself.  Part of the reason for this may be a 
lack of research on how the mind is viewed generally, aside from research on specific 
mental state understanding.  To fill this gap, this paper asks three main questions: (1) 
What is known about children’s and adults’ conceptualization of the mind? (2) How does 
this understanding develop over time as children grow and technology changes? and (3) 
How do children and adults determine whether something has a mind?  
Conceptualization of the Mind and Brain 
To date, there has been very little research that has addressed children’s and 
adults’ generalized conceptualization of the mind.  In a series of four experiments, 
Johnson and Wellman (1982) investigated generalized conceptions of the mind and brain.  
One study focused on a comparison of children’s understanding of the mind and brain.  In 
this study, 5- to 15-year-olds were asked questions about the nature of the mind and brain 
(e.g., where they are located, whether they can be seen or touched), whether or not an 
assortment of mental (think, remember), emotional (interested, happy), sensory (see, 
hear), motor (talk, walk) and involuntary (breathe, sneeze) acts could be performed 
without the brain and, separately, the mind, and whether the mind or brain could exist 
without the other.  Results indicated that children conceptualize the brain and mind as 
separate entities.  Whereas younger children only claimed that the mind and brain differ 
physically, older children claimed that the brain and mind differ both ontologically and 
functionally. Older children conceptualized the mind, unlike the brain, as intangible and 
invisible. They further distinguished the brain from the mind in that the brain was more 
frequently associated with bodily acts (e.g., walk, talk) whereas the mind was viewed as 
“reserved for more purely mental acts” (p. 229). Still, both the brain and mind were 
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claimed to be responsible for mental acts and, increasingly with age, emotional acts.  
Finally, whereas younger children tended to view the mind and brain as independent from 
each other, older children tended to either view the mind and brain as interdependent or 
viewed the mind as dependent on the brain, but not vice-versa. 
In the three remaining studies, Johnson and Wellman (1982) looked solely at 
children’s and adults’ conceptualization of the brain.  Two of these studies investigated 
conceptions of the brain using a similar methodology to the study discussed above.  The 
main difference between these two studies and the above study was that participants were 
asked whether certain activities required a brain (as opposed to whether those activities 
could be performed without a brain).  Thus, in these two studies, 3- to 11-year-olds and 
adults were asked whether the brain is required for an assortment of mental and motor 
acts (all ages), and emotional, school, sensory, and involuntary acts (5-year-olds to 
adults).  Five- to 11-year-olds were also asked questions about the nature of the brain 
(e.g., where it is located, what it does).  Three-year-olds tended to exhibit very little 
knowledge of the functions of the brain, and responded to the mind/brain questions in an 
undifferentiated manner.  By four years of age, children indicated that the brain was 
needed for mental acts.  Children five years of age and older indicated that the brain was 
needed for emotional and school acts (e.g., spell, count, read).  Claims that sensory and 
motor acts required a brain increased with age.  Finally, only adults claimed that the brain 
was required for involuntary acts.  It was concluded that 3-year-olds are ignorant of the 
functions of the brain.  Whereas children as young as four view the brain as needed only 
for intellectual acts, older children have a more inclusive view of the brain in which non-
mental acts are also considered to be controlled by the brain.  Adults view the brain as 
needed for all types of acts. 
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In their last study, Johnson and Wellman (1982) investigated young children’s 
understanding of the physical relation between the head and brain.  Three- to 5-year-olds 
were asked whether the experimenter and a doll had a number of external facial features 
(e.g., eyes, head) and a brain, and whether these features were inside or outside of the 
body.  Although 3-year-olds did not systematically confuse the head with the brain, they 
tended to claim that the doll possessed a brain.  By four years of age, most children 
indicated that the brain was internally located and that the doll did not possess a brain. 
The Johnson and Wellman (1982) studies provide a good launching point from 
which to further investigations into conceptualizations of the mind.  They are, however, 
limited in some respects.  Although one of the four studies compared the mind and brain, 
the bulk of the research only focused on conceptualizations of the brain.  Yet important 
differences were found in conceptualizations of these two entities.  This, combined with 
the finding that children tend to view the mind and brain as separate, argues for more 
research investigating conceptualization of the mind, as well as more detailed 
investigation into how the mind is seen as differing from the brain.  In addition, although 
these studies addressed a good range of task categories, the number of categories used 
limited the number of specific tasks that could be investigated within each category.  
There may be other types of tasks, such as higher-level mental acts (e.g., problem 
solving) and complex emotions (e.g., pride), which may be more indicative of the 
presence of a mind.   
Although there are no other empirical studies that directly address children’s 
conception of the mind, additional insight can be gained by further examining research on 
children’s understanding of the brain. Since Johnson and Wellman (1982) did find some 
similarities in attributional judgments of the mind and brain, it is a logical step to 
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investigate children’s understanding of the brain to determine other possible avenues of 
investigation into their conception of the mind.   
Other studies investigating children’s understanding of the brain have found 
similar results to Johnson and Wellman’s (1982).  Scaife and van Duuren (1995) and van 
Duuren and Scaife (1996) investigated children’s and adults’ judgments of brain and 
brain-related behavior of entities with differential anthropomorphic similarity (person, 
robot, computer, doll and book).  Scaife and van Duuren (1995) asked 5- to 11-year-olds 
and adults whether each of the entities had a brain and heart, where the brain was located 
and what the brain was made of.   At the end of the session, participants were again 
shown pictures of the entities and asked “Is there anything on the table which has a sort 
of brain even though it is different from ours in some way?” (p. 370).  Whereas 5-year-
olds tended to attribute a brain only to the person, older children and adults appeared to 
respond based upon cognitive features.  Older children’s and adults’ most common 
pattern of response was to attribute a brain to the person, robot and computer.   
In a subsequent study, van Duuren and Scaife (1996) asked 5- to 11-year-olds and 
adults to determine whether the entities could perform certain mental, emotional, school-
based, simple motor, sensory and involuntary acts.  Whereas 5-year-olds were more 
likely to make brain-related attributions based on perceptual cues (i.e., physical similarity 
to humans), older children and adults tended to make these determinations based on 
cognitive capabilities, autonomy and, sometimes, conceptual classification.  Children also 
began to claim that the robot was able to perform brain-related behavior at slightly 
younger ages than when they made those same claims for computers.  Overall it was 
concluded that older children and adults consider the computer and robot as more 
ambiguous than a person and doll when considering brain-related behavior.  Finally, 
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younger children were more likely than older children and adults to view intelligent 
artifacts (e.g., computer and robot) as not being able to perform brain-related behaviors. 
The findings of Scaife and van Duuren (1995) and van Duuren and Scaife (1996) 
support and extend Johnson and Wellman’s (1982) findings concerning children’s and 
adults’ conceptualization of the brain.  In all these studies, children and adults were found 
to associate cognitive and mental acts with the brain, and younger children were found to 
be more limited in their brain understanding and brain-related attributions than older 
children and adults.  However, the Scaife and van Duuren (1995) and van Duuren and 
Scaife (1996) studies provide more details about this understanding.  Young children’s 
understanding of the brain is not only more limited than that of older children and adults; 
young children also seem to be more rigid in the criteria used when making brain 
attributions.  Unlike older children and adults, younger children had a tendency first to 
attribute a brain and brain-related behaviors solely to the more human-like intelligent 
entities, indicating that they tend to rely more on perceptual cues in making this 
determination.  Older children and adults seem to make these attributions primarily based 
upon cognitive capabilities.  Further, older children’s and adults’ conception of the brain 
seems to be more flexible in that they appear to indicate that there are different types of 
brains.  When asked to include brains that are different from a human brain, the majority 
of older children and adults attributed a brain to the robot and computer in addition to the 
person (Scaife & van Duuren, 1995).    
In addition to the question of what other mental capabilities children and adults 
might associate with the brain, there is still a question concerning the strength of 
children’s association between cognitive capabilities and the brain.  There are several 
different levels of understanding that children may have.  It may be that children only 
hold a loose association between the brain and cognition, such that they are aware that 
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cognitive capabilities are generally associated with the brain, but they are uncertain of 
exactly what that association is.  Alternately, they may hold a strong association between 
the brain and cognitive capabilities in which they believe that a brain is necessary for 
cognitive capabilities.  However, even if they possess a strong association between the 
brain and cognition, they may not understand certain implications of this.  One important 
implication is that an individual’s cognitive capabilities are bound to that individual’s 
brain.  In other words, individual characteristics, such as identity, cannot be separated 
from that individual’s brain.  Although the above studies investigated the more general 
association between the brain and cognitive capabilities, they did not investigate the 
strength of the association between the brain and individual psychological characteristics, 
such as identity.   
IDENTITY AND THE BRAIN 
This issue of the relation between the brain and a person’s identity is particularly 
interesting.  Philosophers have speculated that transplanting the brain would result in a 
transfer of the mind and self to the recipient of the transplant (Popper & Eccles, 1977).  
Children’s and adults’ claims about the results of a brain transplant could provide 
significant insight into not only children’s and adults’ beliefs about the relation between 
the brain and a person’s identity, but also about how strongly children and adults believe 
the brain is tied to an individual’s cognitive capabilities.  If it is believed that the brain is 
strongly tied to individual capabilities, then when a brain transplant takes place, an 
individual’s cognitive capabilities will also be transplanted.  If, however, the brain is only 
generally associated with cognitive capabilities, but not strongly tied to individual 
characteristics, then an individual’s cognitive capabilities would not be transferred to the 
brain transplant recipient.  Given that young children seem to be in a transitional stage in 
gaining an adult-like understanding of the brain (Johnson, 1990), they may not yet have 
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this understanding even though they generally understand the brain is required for certain 
cognitive acts.      
Two studies have used the brain transplant methodology to investigate children’s 
understanding of the brain.  Johnson (1990) investigated aspects of children’s 
understanding of the brain with regard to individual characteristics.  In a series of four 
studies, 5- to 11-year-olds were told stories and asked questions designed to determine 
whether a brain, heart, mouth or face transplant would have an effect on an entity’s 
identity, physical, cognitive and behavioral characteristics.  Children were told a story 
about the preferences and capabilities of a pig, baby or child character.  Following the 
story, children were told to imagine that their brain, heart, mouth or face was switched 
with or transplanted into the character’s body.  Children were asked about the 
characteristics of the character or themselves after these changes were made.  For 
example, in the first study children were told a story about two pigs.  These pigs were 
described as having characteristics such as liking being pigs and rolling around in the 
mud, and hating sleeping in a bed.  After being told to imagine that their brain was 
transplanted into one of the pigs, children were asked whether the pig would look, act, 
feel or think differently, behave in certain ways (e.g., sleep in a bed or slop, have a child 
or pig for a friend, play with toys or in a pig pen, and have memories as pig or child) and 
have certain identity characteristics (e.g., identify itself as the pig or child, answer to the 
child’s or pig’s name, and claim it was a pig or person).   
The results indicated that children consider the brain more central than the mouth, 
heart or face to someone’s identity, cognitive and behavioral attributions.  The brain also 
had a slight tendency to be more strongly associated with cognitive capabilities than 
behavioral or identity attributions.  For example, children claimed that a brain transplant 
would result in changes in what the transplant recipient thinks, feels and acts, but not in 
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the recipient’s physical appearance.  In contrast, a transplant of the mouth was claimed to 
change physical appearance, but not how the recipient thinks.  Results also seemed to 
indicate that children’s understanding of the brain is still developing in the early school-
aged years.  Unlike older children, younger children tended to respond in an 
undifferentiated manner in the cases in which there were not clear categorical differences 
between the donor and recipient.  For example, when the recipient was a baby, even 
young children were able to determine that a brain transplant would not change any of the 
baby’s physical characteristics.  When the recipient was a child, however, young children 
indiscriminately claimed that the transplants changed irrelevant physical items in almost 
half of their responses.  Johnson (1990) concluded that during the elementary school 
years, children are in a transitional period in which they are learning more concrete 
knowledge about the physical brain, and that this knowledge may provide a foundation 
for more abstract concepts such as the mind. 
Johnson’s (1990) findings extend the findings of previous studies on children’s 
understanding of the brain.  He found that older children, and to a lesser degree younger 
children, do associate the brain with an individual’s identity, thoughts, feelings and 
actions.  These studies, however, did not address the issue of how children’s 
understanding of the relation between the brain and individual characteristics develops 
over time into a more adult-like understanding.  To address this issue, Gottfried, Gelman 
and Shultz (1999) conducted a series of four studies using a brain transplant methodology 
similar to that used by Johnson (1990).  Specifically, Gottfried et al. (1999) investigated 
the development of the “brain as container” metaphor.  According to this model, the brain 
“contains” thoughts, ideas, memories and other mental products.  Thus, a brain transplant 
would also transplant an individual’s mental contents. 
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Four- to 9-year-olds and adults were told stories and asked questions designed to 
determine whether a brain (Studies 1 & 2), stomach (Study 3) and entire bodily internal 
content (Study 4) transplant would effect an animal’s thoughts, memories, vocalizations 
(Study 1 only) or appearance.  Participants were also asked questions about animals’ 
capabilities if the brain were removed.  The results indicated that whereas older children 
and adults tend to consistently use the “brain as container” metaphor when reasoning 
about internal transplants involving the brain, young children generally do not.  Gottfried 
et al. (1999) concluded that although younger children do understand that there is a 
relation between the brain and mental content/capabilities, they do not seem to have fully 
developed the idea of the brain as “containing” mental products.  This is consistent with 
Johnson’s (1990) findings that although younger children understood that there is a 
relation between the brain and mental content, they had difficulty understanding that a 
brain transplant would also result in transplantation of an individual’s identity, thoughts 
and beliefs.   
Gottfried et al. (1999) also found that although children of all ages readily 
understood that an animal with a brain could perform mental acts such as thinking and 
remembering, fewer children correctly responded that an animal without a brain could 
not perform mental acts.  Children’s understanding of the relation between the lack of a 
brain and the inability to perform mental functions seemed to be directly related to their 
level of general knowledge about the brain.  Children who had a greater knowledge of the 
brain were more likely to understand that an animal could not think or remember if it did 
not have a brain.  Gottfried et al. (1999) concluded that children begin with an essentialist 
understanding of the brain in which animals act in certain ways because of their category 
membership.  As children attend school and their understanding of biology increases, 
their understanding of the brain and its functions also increases.  When children reach 
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approximately 8 years of age, they are finally able to understand the significance of the 
role of the brain, and begin to consistently use the “brain as container” metaphor in an 
adult-like manner. 
Although these studies provide a window into understanding conceptualizations 
of the mind, they are limited in that they primarily focus on conceptualizations of the 
brain. It is possible to infer some of how children and adults conceptualize the mind using 
their conceptualization of the brain, but this may not yield an entirely accurate account.  
Johnson and Wellman (1982) did find ontological and functional differences in 
judgments regarding the mind and brain.  It is not only possible, but likely, that other 
differences in conceptualizations of the mind and brain exist.  For example, mental acts 
may be more strongly associated with the mind than the brain, and certain other attributes 
may be more strongly associated with the brain than the mind.  Alternately, it may be that 
certain types of mental acts (e.g., complex mental acts) are more strongly associated with 
the mind than are other types of mental acts (e.g., basic mental acts). Other types of acts 
and characteristics (such as volition, intention, animacy and a sense of self) that were not 
addressed in these studies may also be viewed as having a strong relation with the mind.  
Therefore, it is worthwhile to examine research in other areas that may contribute to 
understanding of children’s and adults’ conceptualization of the mind.  Thus, the 
following section will focus on studies that find relations between various mental state 
capabilities and other attributes such as animacy, emotion and volition. 
 Conceptualization of the Mind- and Brain-Related Attributes 
When thinking about the mind and mental state capabilities, two questions that 
can be posed are ‘Who (or what) has a mind?’ and “Who (or what) has mental state 
capabilities?’  Although there are no studies that directly address what types of entities 
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people believe to have minds, there are a number that examine mental state attributions to 
a variety of different entities.   
ATTRIBUTIONS OF MENTAL STATES AND LIFE 
One relevant area of research is children’s understanding of aliveness and 
animacy (Gelman & Spelke, 1981 ; Gelman & Opfer, in press) .  The ability to determine 
what is alive is an important component of development and a necessary component of 
understanding the social world.  After all, before more advanced technology came along, 
reciprocal and seemingly intentional interactions could only take place with other living 
beings.  Within the animacy literature, there are a number of studies that have found 
relationships between specific mental states and characteristics of animacy. This can 
provide interesting clues to help uncover how people determine whether something has a 
mind. 
One study in particular investigated the relation between mental state capabilities 
and the determination of whether something is alive.  Nigam and Klahr (1999) 
investigated this relation by comparing children’s  beliefs about a number of different 
entities.  Four- to 10-year-olds were presented with pictures of 7 different entities 
(person, monkey, robot, computer, doll, TV and hammer) and asked to determine 
whether these entities were alive and whether they could engage in various cognitive 
(e.g., thinks, has ideas, learns new things, makes mistakes and counts to 10), emotional 
(e.g., is happy, can get lonely) and volitional (e.g., makes choices, sometimes breaks the 
rules) acts.   
Children of all ages were able to determine that the person and monkey were 
alive, but that the computer, doll, TV and hammer were not.  An age trend was found in 
which, as children got older, they increasingly attributed cognitive mental states to 
biological kinds (person and monkey) and intelligent artifacts (robot and computer).  A 
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similar age trend was found in emotional state attributions to biological kinds, 
particularly for the monkey.  However, for the robot and doll, attributions of emotion 
decreased with age.  Volitional attributions dramatically increased with age for the 
person, monkey and robot, and moderately increased for the computer.  Thus, although 
children were willing to attribute cognitive capabilities to both biological kinds and 
intelligent artifacts, they were less likely to attribute emotion and volition to entities that 
are not alive.  Finally, a relation between mental state attribution and animacy was found 
in which high levels of cognitive, emotional and volitional attributions positively 
predicted animacy judgments.  Volition was found to be the strongest predictor, followed 
by emotion.   
Unlike previous studies, the Nigam and Klahr (1999) study provides insight into 
the relation between different types of mental state capabilities and children’s conception 
of life.  Nigam and Klahr found that cognition, emotion and volition can all be used to 
predict whether an entity is alive.  However, they also found that children were willing to 
attribute cognitive capabilities to intelligent artifacts, which are not alive, whereas they 
were only willing to attribute emotion and volition to living biological entities.  Thus, it 
seems that an entity that is alive can perform cognitive acts, but the presence of the 
ability to perform cognitive acts alone does not necessarily mean that the particular entity 
is alive.  This is consistent with studies that investigate children’s explanations of action, 
in which it has been found that children will provide mental explanations of action even 
if they indicate that the actor does not have a brain (Montgomery, 1994).   This can 
provide clues into possible relations between these same types of mental states and the 
presence of a mind.  As was stated previously, the presence of mental state capabilities, 
such as thinking, is often seen as being synonymous with having a mind.  If children’s 
and adult’s attribution of the presence of a mind is similar to attributions of life, then the 
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actual relation between mental states and the presence of the mind may be more 
complicated than a simple “thinking = mind” equation.  As with cognitive capabilities 
and attribution of life, people may believe that the presence of a mind indicates that an 
entity can perform cognitive tasks, but the ability to perform cognitive tasks may not 
necessarily mean that a mind is present.  On the other hand, there may be mental 
capabilities that people believe cannot be present without a mind.  It was found that 
people claim that volition and emotion are only present in entities that are alive.  
Similarly, people may believe that volition and emotion are a critical component of the 
mind, and without a mind volition and emotion are not possible. 
Further, people may believe that in order for a mind to be present, more 
exclusively “human-like” mental capabilities must also be present. .  It has been theorized 
that young children use similarity-based comparisons to humans when making attribution 
judgments (Carey, 1985).  In fact, studies have found that children, and sometimes adults, 
tend to use overall similarity to humans when making attributions of mental capabilities 
(Inagaki & Hatano, 1987; Inagaki & Hatano, 1999; Inagaki & Sugiyama, 1988; 
Montgomery, 1994).  Emotion and volition are arguably more human-like capabilities 
than are certain cognitive abilities (see Rasmussen, et al., 1993).  Nigam and Klahr 
(1999) found that volition and then emotion were the most predictive of the 
determination of life.  Similarly, it may be that volition and emotion are more indicative 
of the presence of a mind than cognition. 
Results from the Nigam and Klahr (1999) study can also provide some clues to 
development in children’s attributions of a mind.  They found that as children age, they 
are more likely to attribute cognitive, emotional and volitional acts to biological entities 
and, in certain cases, intelligent artifacts.  This suggests a pattern in which younger 
children are more stringent in their attributions of mental states whereas older children 
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tend to be more flexible.  This would be consistent with Scaife and van Duuren’s (1995) 
and van Duuren and Scaife’s (1996) findings concerning brain attributions.  They found 
that older children and adults were more flexible than younger children when attributing 
a brain to different types of entities.  This may reflect a global tendency in younger 
children to be more stringent in their willingness to attribute more exclusive human-like 
capabilities.  If this is the case, then it is likely that younger children would be less likely 
than older children and adults to attribute a mind to entities that are not human.   
A number of studies have addressed people’s  attributions of mental states to non-
human animals.  Rasmussen et al. (1993) conducted two studies designed to investigate 
humans’ implicit theories of the animal mind.  College students and animal-behavior 
professionals were presented with a series of test scenarios in which they were asked to 
determine the reasonableness of a series of mental operations or experiences (sensation 
and perception, gratitude, emotion, pleasure and displeasure, object permanence, 
morality, schemata, enumeration and sorting, dreaming, playing and imagining, 
conservation, and memory and foresight) in which the character was either a fish, cat, 
dog, bird or child.  For example, participants were asked how reasonable it would be that 
a fish could distinguish between small, medium and large cookies.   
Overall, the results indicated that all participants credited both the child and 
animals with simple thinking capabilities (sensation and perception, gratitude, emotion, 
pleasure and displeasure, and play and imagination), but were more likely to attribute 
complex thinking (object permanence, morality, schemata, enumeration and sorting, 
dreaming, conservation, and memory and foresight) to the child.  The attribution of 
complex thinking differed significantly between all characters, with the child being more 
capable of complex thinking, followed by the dog, cat, bird and fish, respectively.  
Simple thinking capabilities differed significantly between all characters except for 
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between dogs and cats.  The child was the most likely to be ascribed with simple thinking 
capabilities, followed by dogs and cats, birds and lastly, fish.  A closer investigation of 
the specific mental capabilities found that all participants considered some capabilities 
simple for both the child and animals (sensation and perception, pleasure and displeasure, 
emotion, and gratitude).  Other mental capabilities were considered complex for both the 
child and animals (conservation, memory and foresight, schemata, morality and object 
permanence).  Three mental capabilities differed from these patterns.  Play and 
imagination were considered complex for the child but simple in animals.  However, 
enumeration and sorting, and dreams were seen as simple for the child, but complex in 
animals (Rasmussen et al., 1993). 
In a subsequent study, Rasmussen and Rajecki (1995) further investigated 
human’s implicit theories of the animal mind.  Using a methodology similar to the 
Rasmussen et al. (1993) studies, Rasmussen and Rajecki (1995) asked college students to 
determine how reasonable it would be to say that a boy and, separately, a dog could 
perform a series of mental operations, and experience a number of guilt and shame 
related emotions.  Their findings for the ability to perform mental operations were 
consistent with those of Rasmussen et al. (1993).  Their results for the guilt/shame items 
showed a similar, although not exact, pattern of response as the mental operations.  
Although lower level guilt/shame items were accredited to both the boy and dog, upper 
level guilt/shame items were more likely to be attributed to the boy than to the dog.   
Rasmussen et al.’s (1993) and Rasmussen and Rajecki’s (1995) results are of 
particular interest because they provide an intricate view of lay people’s attributions of 
mental states to a number of different types of entities.  This intricate view shows that  
attributions of mental states are quite detailed and involve various levels of capabilities.  
First, people’s  beliefs about mental states involve more general, overall attributions of 
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mental states to different types of entities (e.g., both humans and animals are capable of 
thinking about things).  There is, however, a second process involved in mental state 
attributions in which individual attributions break down mental state capabilities into 
levels or degrees.  Thus, although both humans and animals may be capable of thinking, 
humans are attributed with a more complex level of thinking capability than animals.  
Finally, these results also illustrate that these levels or degrees differ from one entity-
mental state pair to another entity-mental state pair (i.e., it is not that humans are always 
capable of complex levels of mental states and animals are only capable of simple levels 
of mental states.  It is that certain mental states may be complex in humans but others are 
simple, and the same can be said of animals.).   
Although Rasmussen et al.’s (1993) and Rasmussen and Rajecki’s (1995) studies 
provide  a more detailed view of mental state attribution, there was no direct evaluation 
concerning the presence of a mind in the various entities (i.e., participants were never 
explicitly asked whether the various entities had minds).  However, it is likely that 
people’s  reasoning about mind attribution is similar to that of mental state attributions.  
First, as with mental states, people’s  beliefs about who has a mind likely involve a 
general attribution of a mind to different types of entities.  Thus, it may be that both 
humans and animals are typically attributed with having a mind even though detailed 
capabilities may differ.  Second, individual attributions of a mind may break down into a 
structure similar to levels or degrees in mental states.  In this case, however, it is probable 
that these levels or degrees are equivalent to the attribution of different kinds of minds 
(e.g., it may be that both humans and animals are attributed with a mind, but when 
examined in detail, it may be that they are attributed with minds that differ in some 
fundamental way).  Finally, entity-kind of mind pairs are likely determined by the 
combinations of types and levels of mental state capabilities similar to the entity-mental 
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state pairs.  Thus, people may believe that children have one kind of mind because their 
imagination is complex but their dreams are simple, whereas dogs may have another kind 
of mind because their play is simple but their dreams are complex. 
The more detailed view of mental state attribution provided by the Rasmussen et 
al. (1993) and Rasmussen and Rajecki (1995) studies also serves to illustrate a potential 
problem with extrapolating the relation between mental capabilities and life (from Nigam 
and Klahr, 1999) to the relation between these mental capabilities and the presence of a 
mind.  It could be argued that the exemplars for each of the mental acts that the Nigam 
and Klahr (1999) study used only reflect simple levels of these capabilities.  For example, 
stating that an entity can think could be considered a lower-level cognitive task whereas 
solving a word problem could be considered a higher-level cognitive task.  As the 
Rasmussen et al. (1993) and Rasmussen and Rajecki (1995) studies seem to indicate that 
adults break down attribution of mental state capabilities into levels or degrees, it seems 
likely that this might also be the case with older children.  Further, this would also 
possibly indicate that lower-level and higher-level mental state capabilities might have 
different relations with attributions of life or the presence of a mind.  Thus, it may be that 
although lower-level cognitive acts do not necessarily indicate the presence of a mind, 
higher-level cognitive acts may. 
Rasmussen et al. (1993) and Rasmussen and Rajecki (1995) provide valuable 
insights into adult’s views about how mental state capabilities in animals compare to 
mental state capabilities of human children.  However, their studies are limited in that (1) 
they only use two general types of entities (a child and animals), (2) their studies only 
involve adult participants, and (3) they do not directly address understanding of specific 
concepts (e.g., emotion) but instead focus on beliefs regarding the capabilities of certain 
entities.  Therefore, clues to how other types of entities are viewed, how these beliefs 
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develop in children, and specific information about how these concepts relate to each 
other must be sought from other areas.  
TWO KEY MENTAL STATES 
The Importance of Volition 
One mental state that seems to be of particular importance is volition, or the 
capability to control oneself.  Nigam and Klahr (1999) found that of the three types of 
mental states that they investigated, volition was most predictive of life attribution.  As 
volition can also be regarded as a higher-level, more human-like mental state, and the 
human mind can be considered the best characterization of what a mind is, it seems likely 
that volition will be the one of the most predictive of the mental states in determining the 
presence of a mind. Volition is also considered one of the attributes of animacy.  Gelman 
(1990) states that the development of the concepts of animate and inanimate objects is 
“guided by principled concern for whether objects move on their own or not” (p. 91).  
Gelman and Spelke (1981) suggest that animates, unlike inanimates, can act on their own 
(i.e., have volition) and have mental states and mental representations.  They further posit 
that because children claim that inanimate objects, such as dolls, lack brains and mental 
capabilities, they likely also believe that inanimates lack minds. Therefore, a closer 
investigation of understanding of volition may provide additional clues to what it takes to 
have a mind.  Unfortunately, there is not any research that directly addresses the relation 
between volition and the presence of a mind.  There is, however, quite a bit of research 
on children’s understanding of the relation between different types of movement and life 
attributions.   
Previous studies have found that both children and adults often view movement as 
an indication of life (Carey, 1985; Gelman, 1990; Massey & Gelman, 1988; Piaget, 1973; 
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Richards & Siegler, 1984; Richards & Siegler, 1986).  However, studies have also found 
that movement alone or just any type of movement is not sufficient to make the 
determination of life.  In a series of three studies, Richards and Siegler (1986) 
investigated children’s and adults understanding of the attributes of life.  In Study 1, 4- to 
11-year-olds and adults were asked to name attributes of living things.  For children of all 
ages, movement was the most often cited attribute of life.  Movement was also 
considered significant by adults, and was the fifth most commonly cited attribute of life.  
Study 2 investigated how children and adults determine whether an unfamiliar object is 
alive.  To do so, six important attributes of life were studied: two that are considered 
defining features (growth and reproduction), two that are considered sufficient but not 
necessary characteristics (vision and [plant] rootedness) and two that are characteristics, 
but neither necessary nor sufficient (movement and making noise).  Children and adults 
were presented with a scenario in which they were asked to determine whether a series of 
unfamiliar objects that were found on an alien planet were alive.  Each unfamiliar object 
was described as having and/or not having two of the six attributes described above.  At 
all ages, objects described as having defining features were more likely to be attributed 
with life than those with only characteristic features.  Results also indicated that as 
children got older, they were more likely to attribute life to objects that had defining 
features.  Interestingly, however, movement was still considered an important indication 
of life even though it is not a defining feature.  For all age groups, movement received 
one of the three highest life attribution scores.  This finding was contrary to what was 
expected.  Richards and Siegler had hypothesized that all of the characteristic features 
(roots, vision, movement and noise-making) would be weak indicators of life.  This was 
clearly not the case for movement.   
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To try to better understand the relation between life and motion, Study 3 
investigated how strongly children associate different types of motion with life.  Five- to 
11-year-olds were shown videos depicting movement that varied along four dimensions: 
spontaneity (object is pushed into moving vs. begins moving by itself), goal-directedness 
(object approaches a truck vs. approaches nothing), type of movement apparatus (object 
moves via legs, wheels, or no appendages) and type of terrain (object moves down a hill 
vs. across a flat surface).  After each scenario, children were asked to indicate whether 
the object in the video was alive.  Results indicated that objects that initiated movement 
by themselves (i.e., a form of volition) were judged to be alive whereas those that were 
pushed were judged to not be alive.1  The youngest children (5- and 6-year-olds) only 
associated life with the type of movement apparatus when the apparatus was legs.  As 
with the youngest children, the older children (7- to 10-year-olds) tended to attribute life 
to objects that moved on leg-like appendages.  However, unlike the youngest children, 
the older children also relied heavily on spontaneity in making life attributions.  Richards 
and Siegler (1986) concluded that children do differentiate different types of motion, and 
that these different types of motion strongly influence children’s attributions of life.  
They further concluded that children are willing to attribute life based on the types of 
movement engaged in by animals, but not that of inanimate objects. 
Other studies have found results similar to Richards and Siegler (1986), indicating 
that both children and adults consider intentional movement an indication of life (Massey 
& Gelman, 1988; Richards & Siegler, 1984).  The results from Richards and Siegler 
(1986), however, help provide further understanding of a possible overall pattern 
concerning how children reason about social beings.  The pattern of findings that children 
 
1 It should be noted that goal-directed motion was eliminated from the analyses as the researchers were 
unable to determine whether children viewed the scenario with the truck as depicting goal-oriented 
behavior. 
 23
are willing to attribute life to entities that exhibit the type of movement engaged in by 
animals is similar to findings on children’s attributions of a brain.  Just as 5- and 6-year-
olds were more rigid in their brain attributions than older children (Scaife & van Duuren, 
1995; van Duuren and Scaife, 1996), younger children were also more rigid than older 
children in their attributions of life based on movement.  Whereas older children and 
adults were willing to attribute life based on two of the dimensions presented in the 
Richards and Siegler (1986) study, younger children were only willing to attribute life 
based on one of those dimensions.   
The cues used for attribution of these two characteristics also appear to be 
strikingly similar.  First, in the Scaife and van Duuren (1995) and van Duuren and Scaife 
(1996) studies, younger children seemed to be basing their attributions of a brain on 
perceptual similarity to people.  This also seems to be true in the Richards and Siegler 
(1986) study.  Younger children were only willing to make attributions of life for the 
entity that was most perceptually similar to humans--the entity that used legs for 
movement.  This, combined with Nigam and Klahr’s (1999) findings that as children get 
older they increasingly attribute cognitive, emotional and volitional acts to biological 
entities, can be interpreted as providing additional evidence for the existence of a global 
tendency for young children to be more reluctant than older children to attribute human-
like capabilities.   
Second, unlike younger children, older children’s attributions of both life and a 
brain were strongly based on indications of mental capabilities, including indications of 
volition.  In the Richards and Siegler (1986) study, older children were found to attribute 
life to entities exhibiting self-initiated movement.  Older children in the Johnson and 
Wellman (1982) study indicated that in order to perform voluntary overt acts, a brain 
must be present. .  Intentional behavior such as self-initiated movement and voluntary 
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overt acts can be defined as forms of volition.  This, however, does not necessarily mean 
that children and adults are interpreting these types of behavior as volition, or even seeing 
these as resulting from internal mental states.  A number of studies have been done 
addressing precisely this question.  Specifically, these studies have investigated how 
children and adults interpret intentional action.   
Intentional Action 
Montgomery (1994) conducted a series of studies investigating what types of 
situations influence children’s explanations of action.  In Study 1, preschoolers, first 
graders and adults were asked to determine whether the actions of humans, mammals, 
insects or artifacts were caused by mental or physical states when three situational 
features were present (self-initiated action, variable action and perception of the critical 
fact or event underlying the action).  Participants were presented with 16 descriptions of 
actions in which the situation features were present and 5 in which these features were 
not.  For each action, participants were asked to indicate why the actor was performing 
those actions.  They were then asked whether artifacts such as cars and trains have brains, 
can think, and feel happy and sad.  Results indicated that when actions were accompanied 
by the three situational features, children of all ages consistently chose mental 
explanations for those actions regardless of the type of actor.  Adults tended to limit their 
mental explanations to actions performed by humans and mammals.  When the three 
situational features were not present, preschoolers were more likely to provide a mental 
explanation for the action when the actor was animate, but more likely to provide a 
physical explanation when the actor was inanimate.  Older children and adults, however, 
were equally likely to give physical and mental explanations of the actions regardless of 
the type of actor.  Nevertheless, participants of all ages provided significantly more 
mental explanations for actions when the three situational features were present than 
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when they were not.  Results also indicated that similarity to humans also affects mental 
explanations of actions.  Adults were more likely to provide a mental explanation for an 
action when the actor was more similar to a human, as were children, when the 
situational features were not present.  In sum,Montgomery’s findings indicate that both 
the three situational features and  the type of actor contribute to mental explanations of 
actions. 
In Study 2, Montgomery (1994) further investigated the importance of situational 
features.  The focus of this study was to determine the unique influences of self-initiated 
movement and movement in which perception of the critical fact or event underlying the 
action is present.  Preschoolers and first graders were presented with descriptions of 
actions in which (1) the action was caused by an external physical force, (2) the action 
was self-initiated, (3) a key event underlying the action was not viewed by the character 
in the description, or (4) a key event underlying the action was viewed by the character in 
the description. Following each description, children were asked to provide an 
explanation for the action.  The results indicated that when actions were either self-
initiated or a key event was viewed by the character, children tended to give mental 
explanations for the actions.  Similarly, when the actions were either caused by an 
external force or a key event was not viewed by the character, children typically did not 
give mental explanations for the actions.  It was concluded that children do abstract 
explanations for action based on situational features, and that the situational features do 
help determine what types of explanations are used to explain different types of actions.  
Further, children tend to provide mental explanations for actions that are self-initiated or 
in which critical information underlying the action is present regardless of how many 
other perceptual features are present. 
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Montgomery’s (1994) findings provide direct evidence for the crucial link 
between intentional movement and animacy—imputing mental states.  These findings, 
however, can also provide additional insight into what children and adults are doing in 
general when they witness events.  As stated previously, Montgomery found that children 
provide mental explanations for action when one of two types of situational features is 
present: intentional action or perceptual access to key information underlying the action.  
Richards and Siegler (1986) found that intentional movement or having human-like 
appendages (i.e., legs) to enable movement resulted in children claiming that the actor 
was alive.  Although these findings may have been somewhat disparate, there is one 
explanation that could explain all of them.  All of these situations provide evidence that 
can lead to the conclusion that the actor in these cases is most likely capable of volition.  
After all, one could not intentionally perform an action without control over oneself.  
This, of course, is precisely the type of action portrayed in Montgomery’s (1994) and 
Richards and Siegler’s (1986) studies.  Montgomery’s (1994) other findings that when 
perceptual access to key information underlying the action is present, children provide 
mental explanations for that action, can also be interpreted as imputing volition to the 
actor.  In Montgomery’s second study, all of the actors were human.  Volition is an 
important part of being human, and this, combined with a possible causal explanation for 
the action, is most likely why children gave mental explanations for these types of 
actions.  This connection to humans can also explain Richards and Siegler’s (1986) 
results that children will claim that actors that have legs that are used for motion are 
alive.  Of all of the different entities presented to children in Richards and Siegler’s 
study, the only one that had any perceptual similarity to a human was the square (actor) 
that had legs to move with.  As there was very little other perceptual information 
available, children may have used this to determine that the entity was likely similar in 
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that way to humans, or at least animates.  This, in turn, may have caused them to impute 
volition to the entity based on the probable category membership as human or animate. 
There is, however, evidence that children do indeed use category membership to 
make these types of judgments.  Massey and Gelman (1988) presented 3- and 4-year-olds 
with pictures of unfamiliar objects that fell into one of five categories: mammals, non-
mammalian animals, statues with animal-like forms, wheeled vehicles or multipart-rigid 
objects.  Children were asked to indicate if each object could go up a hill by itself, or go 
down a hill by itself, and whether each was an animal, was alive and why (how they 
could tell).  Children of all ages were able to correctly indicate whether each object could 
go up and down a hill by itself based on its category membership.  Further, when asked to 
explain the reason for their judgments, category membership was the most commonly 
cited.  This is not surprising.  In general, children and adults tend to provide mental 
explanations for human behavior, whereas they tend to provide physical explanations for 
the behavior of inanimate objects (Wellman, Hickling and Schultz, 1997). 
The Importance of Emotion 
Nigam and Klahr’s (1999) findings indicated that emotion was second only to 
volition in its predictive value for determining whether something is alive.  This is 
significant in terms of discovering what children find are the most important aspects of 
life in general, as well as what makes human beings unique.  In this age of technology, 
people are surrounded by objects that are not alive yet seemingly possess mental states 
such as thinking and some forms of problem solving.  It would make sense, then, that 
these cognitive capabilities would not be as predictive of life as more uniquely human 
capabilities such as emotion.  Unfortunately, there is no empirical evidence investigating 
this process, but through the use of clinical-type interviews, structured tasks and natural 
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observation, Turkle (1984, 1991, 1998, 2000a, 200b) has made some interesting 
conclusions about the importance of emotion.   
It has been proposed that when reasoning about the world, children most often 
compare humans with humanity’s “closest neighbors” to establish what makes people 
uniquely human as well as whether something is alive (Turkle, 1984; Turkle, 1991).  
Turkle suggests that before modern technology became part of our everyday life, 
humanity’s closest neighbors were animals.  In comparing humans with animals, both 
children and adults could refer to cognitive capabilities in determining what made 
humans different, and biological and psychological similarities when determining what is 
alive.  According to Turkle (1984, 1991, 1998, 2000a, 200b), however, this is no longer 
the case.  Turkle claims that computers have replaced animals as humanity’s closest 
neighbors. After all, computers arguably have cognitive capabilities closer to humans 
than animals do.  With the advent of computers and computational toys, Turkle believes 
that children and adults have had to rethink what determines whether something is alive 
as well as what makes people uniquely human.  In her research, Turkle’s main finding 
has been that when discussing what is alive, children tend to focus on physical aspects of 
objects.  With computers, however, they focus on psychological properties, just as they 
would with humans.  Computational objects, it seems, are treated as psychological 
beings, not as objects.  This persists even after children have participated in discussions 
about the role of biological properties in life.   
Turkle reports that between the ages of 4 and 12, the discussion of the aliveness of 
computers seems to increase and become more sophisticated.  Further, experience with 
computers tends to increase the use of psychological discourse when discussing whether 
computers are alive or not.  In children’s justifications about whether computational 
objects are alive or not, emotion is cited as the key factor in this determination.  When 
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comparing computational objects to humans and reasoning about whether they are alive, 
children often refer to those psychological qualities that humans have but that computers 
don’t.  Hence, children tend to focus on emotion.  Humans can experience emotions.  
Computational objects, regardless of their cognitive sophistication, cannot. 
So, what has been the effect of having computers as humanity’s nearest neighbors 
on children’s concept of life?  It seems that what is considered alive has changed.  
Specifically, it is not that being biologically alive has been redefined.  Instead, a new type 
or category of life has emerged that is different from the traditional definition of what it 
means to be alive.  Turkle has found that many children have formed a new category of 
aliveness, that of being “sort of alive”.  This could, in some respects, be described as 
artificial life—being alive, yet not really alive like humans are.  Children’s views about 
what is alive are a reflection of the quality of their interactions with different objects.  
When children form a social relationship with computers by interacting with them, 
having emotional reactions to them and treating them as if they were alive, this may feel 
like evidence that they are alive.  Yet, computers do not fit the definition of what is 
traditionally biologically alive.  So, what differentiates really being alive and “sort of 
alive” may be the presence of emotion. 
A parallel may exist in terms of determining whether something has a mind.  
According to Turkle (1984), the computer is treated as a psychological entity in “ways in 
which it seems or does not seem to be like a human being in the qualities of its mind” (p. 
46).  Thus, just as children seem to have created a new form of what it means to be alive, 
it seems likely that for computational objects, they may create a new type of mind.  It 
may not be what is traditionally considered a mind, such as a human or animal mind, but 
perhaps an artificial mind.  As with artificial life, it may be that emotion is the major 
determinant of what is a real mind and what is an artificial mind.  Given this possibility, 
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it is also important to consider the potential repercussions this may have when 
investigating children’s and adult’s beliefs about the nature of the mind.  The most 
straightforward way of investigating whether children and adults believe that a particular 
object or entity has a mind is simply to ask them directly (e.g., does X have a mind?).  If 
children believe there are different kinds of minds, however, one must use caution when 
drawing conclusions using this methodology.  It is unclear whether, in answering this 
question, children and adults would focus on the most prototypical, or human-like, mind, 
or whether they would consider both real and artificial types of minds.  This is an area 
that needs to be investigated, as the questions of interest include what types of mind are 
considered in various situations, as well as determining what additional types of cues (if 
any) would lead children and adults to consider other possibly less prototypical types of 
minds. 
Turkle’s (1984, 1991, 1998, 2000a, 200b) research helps discern the importance 
of emotion in children’s judgments about the determination of life.  However, her 
conclusions do need to be treated with some caution.  Turkle’s main method of gaining 
insight into children’s conceptualization of computational objects involves clinical-type 
interviews.  Although this type of methodology is useful in that it is typically open-ended, 
allowing the researcher to gain added detail when interviewing participants, it tends to 
lack a systematic quality that is needed to make concrete, verifiable conclusions.  Still, 
the insight Turkle’s methods have provided are useful stepping stones towards the 
creation of more concrete, verifiable research methods to investigate these particular 
questions. 
The importance of emotion in determining what is and is not alive, and what does 
and does not have a mind is also reflected in Human-Computer Interaction literature.  
Within that research, one focus has been on the creation of “believable entities.”  These 
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are entities that have characteristics that provide the illusion of life and allow users to 
suspend their disbelief that these entities are not real (Bumby & Dautenhahn, 2001).  
Some researchers claim that in order to have a believable entity, emotion must be an 
integral part of its design.  Bates (1994) claims that emotion is “one of the primary means 
to achieve this believability, this illusion of life” (p.124).  He further suggests that 
creators of believable entities use the three key points about believable entities proposed 
by Disney animators, that: (1) the emotional state of the entity should be clearly defined, 
(2) the entity’s thought processes should reveal the emotion, and (3) the emotion should 
be accentuated in a time-sensitive manner.  Grand (2000) also encourages the inclusion of 
emotion in believable entities, as well as intelligence and a certain level of self-
motivation. 
COMPUTERS AND ROBOTS AS SOCIAL ACTORS 
A final area that can be probed to gain clues about people’s  conceptualization of 
the mind is how humans interact with computers and robots.  As with many of the other 
areas of interest that have been discussed in this paper, there are no studies that directly 
investigate relations between conceptions of the mind and human interaction with 
computers or robots.  However, research into people’s interactions with intelligent 
entities may provide some insight into how this may affect people’s conceptualization of 
the mind.   
Research has found that both children and adults tend to treat computers as social 
entities (Turkle, 1984, 1991, 1998, 2000a, 200b) even though they are aware that those 
types of responses are inappropriate (Bracken, 2000; Nass, Steuer, Henrikson & Dryer, 
1994; Nass, Steuer & Tauber, 1994).  In a series of five studies, Nass et al. (1994) 
presented undergraduates with computer programs designed to appear to be a tutoring 
system.  Participants were told that they would proceed through three sections, tutoring, 
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testing and evaluation.  Following the evaluation session, participants were asked to 
complete a questionnaire on their attitudes about the three sessions.  Overall, results 
indicated that adults tend to treat computers as social entities and variation in the 
characteristics the computers portray affects how the computers are viewed.  Social 
norms were found to be applied to computers, as were the notions of self and other.  For 
example, although participants claimed that norms of politeness were not applicable to 
interactions with computers, participants consistently provided more praise in their 
follow-up questionnaires when those questionnaires were completed on the same 
computer they had worked on than when the questionnaires were administered either 
using paper and pencil, or on a different computer.  This pattern of behavior is similar to 
that found when parallel interactions take place between social actors.  In addition, 
different voices coming from computers tended to be treated as individual social actors, 
even if the voices came from the same computer.  For example, participants tended to 
claim that praise given by a voice different from that used during the tutorial series was 
more positive, friendlier and more accurate.  Again, this is that same pattern that would 
be expected if the participants had engaged in parallel interactions with social actors.  
Finally, adults were found to automatically and unconsciously respond socially to 
computers, and computer users viewed social interaction as being with the computer 
itself, not with the programmer.   
Other studies have found similar results.  Bracken (2000) investigated children’s 
interactions with computers.  Similar to Nass et al. (1994), Bracken (2000) used computer 
tasks and praise to gauge participants’ attitudes towards the computers.  She found that 
children, like adults, react to computers as if they are social entities.  Scheibe and Erwin 
(1979) investigated adult’s reactions to computers when playing computer games of 
varying intelligence.  They recorded and analyzed participant’s verbalizations while 
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engaged in playing these games.  They found that participants tended to personify the 
computer through use of personal pronouns.  Further, they found that the greater the level 
of intelligence of the computer game, the more likely personal pronouns would be used to 
personify the computer.  Hyson (1985) investigated the emotional effects of computer use 
in children.  Five-year-olds were videotaped while using a computer drawing program, 
face construction program and counting program.  They found that all three types of 
programs elicited positive, active and complex facial expressions in the children.  The 
drawing program in particular tended to elicit high levels of social engagement.  It was 
concluded that the motivational value of the emotion elicited during this computer use 
and the autonomy and control it allowed children were the primary reasons for the 
positive affect experienced when interacting with the computer. 
Some researchers even claim that interactions with computers increase people’s 
understanding of the mental world.  Fletcher-Flinn and Suddendorf (1996) conducted a 
study investigating the effects of computer use on children’s development of 
metacognitive abilities.  Preschool children were given a battery of tests measuring 
mental age, source memory, false-belief understanding, and the ability to disassociate 
from the present and predict future knowledge.  They were also observed during play.  
The amount and level of social play as well as the frequency of play with typical toys was 
recorded. The children’s parents were asked to complete a survey asking about whether 
there was a computer in the home, availability of a computer at home or elsewhere, and 
the frequency of computer use by the child.  A significant positive relation was found 
between computer use and metacognition.  Fletcher-Flinn and Suddendorf concluded that 
computer use helps children’s understanding of the mental world because the social 
interaction involved encourages children to take an explicit and observable intentional 
stance with computers, and aids children in developing representational abilities.  As 
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fascinating as Fletcher-Flinn and Suddendorf’s conclusions are, they do need to be 
considered with some hesitation.  Their conclusions suggest causal relations between 
computer use and metacognitive understanding, yet their analyses are correlational.  
Although there may be a causal relation, further studies would need to be done to confirm 
it. 
THE CURRENT STUDIES 
People’s  conceptualization of the mind is relevant to many different fields of 
research.  To truly understand people’s  conceptualization of the mind, three general 
areas should be investigated:  (1) How children and adults conceptualize the general 
nature of the mind and its capabilities, (2) how this understanding develops over time as 
children grow and technology changes, and (3) how children and adults determine what 
has a mind.  The current studies were designed to provide some insight into these 
questions. Specifically, these studies were designed to help determine what types of 
attributes children and adults will claim an object or entity must have in order to claim 
the object or entity has a mind. 
The first study employs the use of intelligent artifacts (e.g., robot and computer) 
to determine the relation between various attributes and the presence of a mind.  
Intelligent artifacts are particularly useful for this type of inquiry because of their 
ambiguous nature (Gelman, 1988; Keil, 1989); they are man-made artifacts yet they 
exhibit characteristics common to social beings and natural kinds (Turkle, 1984; Nigam 
& Klahr, 1999).  Previous studies investigating understanding of the brain (Scaife & van 
Duuren, 1995; van Duuren & Scaife, 1996) and attributes of life (Nigam & Klahr, 1999) 
have used intelligent artifacts to investigate their questions of interest.  A similar but 
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more encompassing methodology was used in Study 1 to investigate understanding of the 
mind. 
 Pilot Study 1 
METHOD 
Participants 
Participants were 13 younger children (4;4 - 7;0, M = 5;5), 12 older children (7;9 - 
11;20,M = 10;8), and 18 adults (ages 34 - 54, M= 42). Adult participants were the parents 
of the children who participated. Participants were predominantly middle-class and 
Caucasian, but various ethnic groups were represented. 
Materials 
Materials consisted of 11 laminated 4x4 inch pictures of people (adult, child and 
baby), animals (parrot, cat and fish), intelligent artifacts (robot and computer), and 
inanimate objects (rock, TV and flower), and two boxes, one marked with the word "can" 
and the  other with the words "can not." 
Procedure 
Children were interviewed individually at the Children's Research Lab. Children 
were asked questions and given sorting tasks aimed at determining which attributes 
children associate with different types of people (adult, child and baby), animals (parrot, 
cat and fish), intelligent artifacts (robot and computer) and inanimate objects (rock, TV 
and flower). The attributes used reflect various types of capabilities and characteristics 
(see Table 1), and were chosen based on attributes used in previous studies investigating 
the brain and attribution of life (Johnson, 1990; Johnson & Wellman, 1982; Nigam & 
Klahr, 1999; Rasmussen et. Al, 1993; Rasmussen & Rajecki, 1995; Scaife & van Duuren, 
1995; van Duuren & Schaife, 1996).  
Table 1. Attributes used in Study 1 organized by attribute type. 
Type of Attribute Attributes Used 
Emotion Feel happy, Feel proud 
Senses See things, Say things 
Sensations Feel hot in a hot room, Feel hurt if they fall on the floor 
Intentional behavior Do something just because they want to, Sometimes be 
naughty 
Physical states Go to sleep, Get sick 
Mental Acts Think about something, Play a game, Remember a phone 
number, Remember what happened yesterday, Want 
something, Pretend to be something 
Which ones…  have a Mind, have a Brain, are Alive 
 ______________________________________________ 
Sense of Self Know what one is (e.g., a baby knows that it’s a baby) 
 
Warm-up Task.  Children were first given a warm-up task consisting of 4 sets of 
questions. In each of these sets, children were asked where certain body parts (foot, heart, 
brain and mind) are and what can be done with them. Children were also asked whether 
they can see or touch the brain and mind.  The purpose of using the foot and heart 
questions was so that children would have been asked about body parts that both can and 
cannot be seen before being asked about the brain and mind.  Questions were grouped by 
body part, and the foot and heart questions were always asked first. Questions asking 
about the brain and mind were the third and fourth questions, and were counterbalanced 
between subjects. 
Sorting Task.  Children were then given a sorting task. Children were first shown 
a series of 11 pictures of different types of people, animals, and things (see above) and 
 36
 37
asked what the pictures depicted.  The purpose of this was to ensure that the children 
recognized the entities and objects in the pictures.  Children were then shown two boxes 
(Can, Can Not), and told that they would be asked to answer some questions by sorting 
the pictures into the boxes. Specifically, they were told that those that could do what they 
are asked about should be put in the Can box and those that could not do what they are 
asked about should be put in the Can Not box. A practice question was then asked: 
"Which ones can walk all by themselves?"  The experimenter sorted the adult and rock 
pictures, and the children were asked to sort the child, cat, fish and flower pictures.  
Children were then asked ten "Which ones can [attribute]?" questions and told to 
sort the pictures in the Can and Can Not boxes as described above. These first ten 
attributes were randomly taken from the list of attributes found in Table 1. Following 
these sorting tasks, children were asked self-knowledge questions about each of the 
pictures. For example, children were asked whether children know that they are children. 
Children were then given nine additional sorting tasks using the remaining attributes 
found in Table 1. Finally, children were asked whether they believed that the mind and 
brain are the same thing or different things.  The protocol and response form for Pilot 
Study 1 can be found in Appendix A.  
A questionnaire was given to parents when they brought their child into the lab. 
This questionnaire primarily assessed parents' beliefs about the same attributes and kinds 
of entities that the children were questioned about. Parents were asked to fill out the 
questionnaire either before (preferable if they wished to watch their children participate) 
or during their child's participation.  The parent questionnaire for Pilot Study 1 can be 
found in Appendix B. 
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Pilot Data Results 
Participants of all ages attributed significantly fewer characteristics to intelligent 
artifacts than to people or animals, but attributed more characteristics to intelligent 
artifacts than to inanimate objects. Participants’ patterns of response were analyzed by 
averaging their scores across entities for each attribute type, and then using correlations 
to determine which characteristics are most associated with having a mind and brain. 
There was very little variation in grown-up, child, rock, and TV entity scores. Therefore, 
the analyses were restricted to the parrot, cat, fish, flower, robot and computer entities. 
Overall, the ability to perform mental acts (r =.65, p < .001) and engage in intentional 
behavior (r =.51, p < .001) were found to be most strongly correlated with the presence of 
a mind, followed by the ability to experience emotion (r =.35, p < .05) and sensations (r 
=.30, p < .05).  The presence of a brain was found to be most strongly correlated with 
intentional behavior (r =.48, p =.01), followed by the presence of senses (r =.35, p < .05) 
and the ability to perform mental acts (r =.32, p < .05). 
Age differences were also found.  Children’s responses, but not adults’, exhibited 
an influence of anthropomorphic qualities.  Children were significantly more likely to 
attribute the robot than the computer with experiencing emotion (F(2,40) = 6.59, p < .01), 
senses (F(2,40) = 12.72, p <  .001), intentional behavior (F(2,40) = 7.27, p < .01), and 
mental acts (F(2,40) = 8.47, p < .001).  Younger children (M = .23) were more likely than 
adults (M = 0) to attribute a mind to a robot (p =.05). 
Pilot Data Conclusions  
 (1)  Previous research has found that robots and computers are generally seen as 
lying along a continuum in which they are viewed as different from both inanimate 
objects and social beings in terms of the presence of a brain and brain-like capabilities.  I 
additionally found that when attributing a mind and mind-like capabilities, people also 
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view intelligent artifacts as different from both animate entities and inanimate entities. 
Thus, intelligent artifacts are not viewed as entirely inanimate objects or social beings.  
This provides further support for the assertion that people view intelligent artifacts as 
having their own separate category (i.e., they are not viewed as merely inanimates with 
some special abilities, but instead are something distinctively in-between animate and 
inanimate entities). 
 (2)  Although people view the mind and brain as having overlapping 
capabilities, there are differences in which attributes indicate the presence of a mind and 
a brain.  Results indicate that the ability to perform mental acts and engage in intentional 
behavior are both associated with the presence of a mind and a brain.  However, whereas 
mental acts and intentional behavior were found to have strong associations with the 
presence of a mind, the ability to perform mental acts was found to only have a moderate 
relation with the presence of a brain.  Further, whereas sensations were moderately 
associated with the presence of a mind, sensations were not found to be significantly 
related to the presence of a brain.  Finally, whereas senses were moderately associated 
with the presence of a brain, senses were not found to be significantly related to the 
presence of a mind. 
 (3)  Children and adults focus on different criteria when making 
attributions of the presence of a mind and mind-like capabilities.   Similar to previous 
studies, children were more likely than adults to rely upon anthropomorphic similarity to 
humans when making attributions of certain mind-like capabilities.  Younger children, 
but not older children, were more likely than adults to attribute a mind to the robot than to 
the computer.  Unlike previous studies, however, older children also relied upon 
anthropomorphic similarity for certain attributions.  Children of all ages were found to be 
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more likely to accredit the robot than computer with experiencing emotion, senses, 
intentional behavior, and mental acts.   
Suggested Changes  
Piloting of Study 1 did not reveal any unexpected methodological concerns.  
Participation time in the study was typically under 15 minutes, even for the youngest 
participants (5-year-olds).  None of the participants had any difficulty completing the 
tasks or answering the questions.  The data analyses, however, revealed that responses to 
the adult and child questions were identical. Therefore, the child item/entity was not 
included in the list of entities used in Study 1. 
 Study 1 
METHOD 
Participants 
Participants were 75 children, 26 5-year-olds (4;4 – 5;11, M = 5;6, 10 males, 16 
females), 24 8-year-olds (7;9 – 8;11, M = 8;5, 15 males, 9 females), 25 11-year-olds (10;4 
– 12;0. M = 11;5, 8 males, 19 females) and 57 adults (34 - 54, M = 42, 24 males, 33 
females). The age groups that were chosen for participation in this study were based upon 
Johnson and Wellman’s (1982) findings that indicated that school-aged children are in a 
transitional period regarding their understanding of the mind and brain. Participants were 
predominantly middle-class and Caucasian, but various ethnic groups were represented. 
Materials 
Materials consisted of 10 laminated 4x4 inch pictures of people (adult and baby), 
animals (parrot, cat and fish), intelligent artifacts (robot and computer) and inanimate 
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objects (rock, TV and flower), and two boxes, one marked with the word "can" and the  
other with the words "can not." 
Procedure 
The procedure for Study 1 was the same as the pilot study, except that 10 instead 
of 11 entities were used.   
RESULTS 
Overview of Analyses and Statistical Procedures. Descriptive statistics, Chi-
square, Factor Analysis, and Hierarchical Generalized Linear Models (HGLM) were used 
to describe and analyze the Study 1 data. The descriptive statistics provide an overall 
summary of the data, broken down by entity and specific mind/brain-related questions. 
Chi-square was used to analyze the question regarding whether the mind and brain are 
considered the same thing or different things. Factor Analysis and HGLM was used to 
provide insight into differences between entity types regarding mind- and brain-related 
judgments, as well as to investigate the relationships between the outcome variables 
(Mind and Brain) and the different attribute types (Emotion, Senses, Sensations, 
Intentional Behavior, Physical States, Basic Mental Acts, Advanced Mental Acts and 
Sense of Self). The use of HGLM is an appropriate modeling framework for multilevel 
data with nonlinear structural models and nonnormally distributed errors (Raudenbush & 
Bryk, 2002). The data in the present study is nominal-scale, binary repeated measures 
categorical data, which fits suitably in the HGLM framework.  
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Table 2. Percentage of participants who claimed that each entity has (or is capable of) 
each attribute (N=132). 
Attribute 
Type   Attribute 
Grown 





Happy 99 98 80 87 57 5 0 0 13 2 
 Feel Proud 99 82 52 67 33 2 1 1 14 1 
Senses See things 100 98 99 98 96 2 0 1 47 6 
  Say things 100 87 89 53 14 1 0 25 56 33 
Sensations Feel Hot 99 95 89 92 64 30 7 4 13 4 
  Feel Hurt 98 99 82 85 64 5 1 2 7 2 
Intentional 
Do what it 
wants 99 88 84 89 75 5 1 2 17 4 
Behavior Naughty 95 83 85 89 39 0 0 2 25 7 
Physical Go to sleep 98 99 98 99 82 8 0 11 18 18 
States Get Sick 99 100 97 99 96 48 0 7 12 19 
Mental Think 99 93 77 81 58 3 1 2 16 7 
Acts Want  97 98 92 95 79 15 0 1 17 3 
 
Remember 
Yesterday 98 50 52 56 29 1 0 1 30 17 
 
Remember 
Phone # 98 16 25 4 5 2 1 5 38 36 
 Pretend 98 59 33 30 23 2 1 1 19 2 
  
Play a 
Game 98 80 58 70 24 0 0 8 42 35 
Sense of 
Self Know Self 100 44 50 61 48 10 4 5 23 10 
            
  
Has a 
Mind 99 99 92 92 75 4 0 2 12 8 
 
Has a 
Brain 100 98 95 95 89 2 0 4 16 14 
  Alive 99 100 100 98 98 69 2 2 8 2 
 
Descriptive Statistics.  Overall, no significant differences were found for sex or 
age group (using HGLM). Therefore, data were grouped by entity and attribute. The 
percentage of participants who claimed that each entity has (or is capable of) each 
individual attribute (i.e., each question) can be found in Table 2. In sum, participants 
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indicated that grown-ups are capable of everything and rocks are not capable of anything. 
Babies were judged as capable of most things, but were judged as less capable of certain 
mental acts (remember yesterday: 50%, remember a phone number: 16%, and pretend: 
59%) and knowledge about themselves (i.e., knows it’s a baby: 44%). Participants also 
indicated that the parrot and cat were, overall, slightly less capable than grown-ups in 
most areas, but particularly less capable in terms of certain mental acts (remember 
yesterday: 56% & 29%, remember a phone number: 25% & 4%, pretend: 33% & 30%, 
and play a game: 58% & 70%) and knowledge about themselves (50% & 61%). Fish 
were judged to be slightly less capable than parrots and cats in all areas. Flowers were 
judged as incapable of most acts, with the exception of feeling hot (30%) and getting sick 
(48%), and judged as lacking a mind and brain. Results also indicated that flowers were 
judged as slightly less likely than animals to be alive. This difference, however, is likely a 
reflection of most 5-year-olds indicating that a flower is not alive (27% indicated that a 
flower is alive). The capabilities of TV’s were judged as similar to those of rocks, with 
the exception of the ability to say things (25%). Finally, the robot and computer were 
judged as having some capabilities in most areas, while lacking a mind and brain, and not 
being alive.  
Robot and Computer Similarity. Chi-square analyses indicated that, overall, the 
robot and computer were judged similarly (see below), with the exception of the ability to 
see things, χ2(1, N=264)=58.24, p<.001). These differences in judgment were particularly 
evident in children (5-year-olds: 77% vs. 4%, 8-year-olds: 83% vs 0%, 11-year-olds: 
62% vs 12%, adults: 12% vs 7%). 
Mind/Brain Equivalence. A 4 x 2 (age group x mind/brain equivalence) chi-
square was used to analyze whether participants indicated that the mind and brain are the 
same thing or different things. Results found significant age differences, χ2(3, N=97) = 
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10.98, p<.01. Further analyses of participants patterns of response indicated that whereas 
5-, 8-, and 11-year-olds responded at chance levels, adults were significantly more likely 
than chance to claim that the mind and brain are different things, χ2(1, N=33) = 18.94, 
p<.01.  
Entities and Ascriptions of a Mind and Brain. The HGLM modeling framework 
was used to analyze how entities are viewed regarding the presence of a mind and brain. 
The most informative manner of reporting HGLM results is using Odds Ratios. An odds 
ratio (OR) indicates whether the probability of a certain event (or in this case, a certain 
response) is statistically equivalent for two groups. For example, one question could be 
whether 5-year-olds and 8-year-olds are equally likely to claim that a cat has a mind. In 
this case, the event is the response indicating whether the cat has a mind, and the two 
groups are the 5-year-olds and 8-year-olds.An OR of 1 indicates that the probability of an 
event is equally likely in two groups. An OR significantly greater than or less than 1 
indicates that an event is more likely in one of the groups than the other (Pocket 
dictionary of statistics, 2001). 
No significant differences were found for sex, or between entities within each 
entity type (e.g., between babies and grown-ups ). Therefore the data were grouped 
according to age group and entity type (humans, animals, plants, intelligent artifacts and 
inanimates), with the presence of a mind and brain as the outcome variables.  
Significant differences were found between age groups. Eight- and 11-year-olds 
were significantly more likely than 5-year-olds to claim overall that entities had a mind 
(8-year-olds: OR=2.42, p<.05; 11-year-olds: OR=2.39, p<.05) and a brain (8-year-olds: 
OR=3.42, p<.05; 11-year-olds: OR=3.63, p<.05). Adults were significantly less likely 
than 5-year-olds to claim that entities had a mind (OR=.39, p<.05). Another way of 
expressing these findings ((1-OR)*100) is that 8-year-olds are 142% more likely than 5-
year-olds to respond that entities had a mind, and 241% more likely than 5-year-olds to 
respond that entities had a brain. Eleven-year-olds were found to be 139% more likely 
than 5-year-olds to respond that entities had a mind, and 263% more likely than 5-year-
olds to respond that entities had a brain. Adults were found to be 63% less likely than 5-
year-olds to respond that entities had a mind.  
Figure 1. The mean percentage of positive responses for the questions regarding the 
attribution of a mind and brain, the capability to perform mental acts, and 
the capability to perform advanced mental acts (remember a phone number, 
remember what happened yesterday, and pretend to be something else) 




A main effect of entity type was found for both the presence of a mind and a 
brain. For all ages, participants were significantly more likely to attribute the presence of 
a mind and a brain to humans (Mind: OR=1668.47, p<.01; Brain: OR=516.05, p<.01), 
and animals (Mind: OR=3709.83, p<.01; Brain: OR=53.72, p<.01) than to intelligent 
artifacts. Results also indicated that participants were significantly less likely to attribute 
a mind or a brain to plants (Mind: OR=.35, p<.01; Brain: OR=.10, p<.01) and inanimate 
objects (Mind: OR=.11, p<.01; Brain: OR=.12, p<.01) than to intelligent artifacts. An 
illustration indicating each entity’s mean percentage of positive responses for the 
questions regarding the attribution of a mind and brain can be found in Figure 1. There 
were no significant interactions found. 
Attribute Types and Ascriptions of a Mind and a Brain. Factor analysis and the 
HGLM modeling framework was used to analyze how attribute types are related to the 
presence of a mind and brain. The data were averaged and grouped by attribute type, 
resulting in 7 variables, and subjected to a factor analysis. The factor analysis used the 
maximum likelihood extraction method and varimax transformation method. After 
inspection of the eigenvalues and scree plot, a three-factor solution was deemed 
appropriate. The factor loadings are as follows. Factor 1 included sense of self (factor 
loading: .735) and emotion (factor loading .735) attribute types, and accounted for 43.5% 
of the variance. The reliability (internal consistency) was .78. Factor 2 included 
sensations (factor loading: .760) and physical states (factor loading: .787) attribute types, 
and accounted for 14.7% of the variance. The reliability (internal consistency) was 
.78. Factor 3 included the senses (factor loading: .920) attribute type, and accounted for 
12.6% of the variance. The reliability (internal consistency) was .78. The resulting factors 
can be considered as reflecting: (1) more “human-like” capabilities (sense of self and 
emotion), (2) basic animate characteristics (sensations and physical states), and (3) 
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senses. Results further indicated that the remaining two variables, intentional behavior 
and mental acts, were complex variables that split across Factor 1 (factor loadings: .456 
and.480 respectively) and Factor 3 (factor loadings: .475 and .516 respectively). Complex 
variables are difficult to interpret, so further analysis of the types of attributes was 
needed. 
 Hierarchical Generalized Linear Models (HGLM) was used to further investigate 
the different attribute types, as well as the relationships between the different attribute 
types (Emotion, Senses, Sensations, Intentional Behavior, Physical States, Basic Mental 
Acts, Advanced Mental Acts and Sense of Self) and ascriptions of a mind and a brain. As 
was mentioned previously, HGLM results are reported using Odds Ratios. Odds Ratios 
provide the highest level of accuracy for determining the contribution of specific 
variables within a model.  However, to provide a greater understanding of the data, 
probabilities will also be reported for the percent of variation explained by each model as 
a whole.  
 No significant differences were found for sex, age group or between attributes 
within each attribute type (e.g., feel happy and feel proud for the attribute type emotion) 
with the exception of mental acts. Recall that the mental acts attribute type included the 
following attributes: think about something, want something, remember what happened 
yesterday, remember a phone number, pretend to be something else and play a game. 
Results indicated that there were significant differences between some, but not all, of the 
attributes in mental acts. To verify this, the data was subjected to t-tests. Specifically, 
think about something, want something, and play a game were all found to be 
significantly different from remember what happened yesterday (t(131) = 5395, p < .01 ; 
t(131) = 9.87, p < .01 ; t(131) = 4.27, p < .01 respectively), remember a phone number 
(t(131) = -12.79, p < .01 ; t(131) = -20.28, p < .01 ; t(131) = -11.86, p < .01 respectively), 
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and pretend to be something else (t(131) = 11.81, p < .01 ; t(131) = 13.78, p < .01 ; t(131) 
= 7.65, p < .01 respectively), but not significantly different from each other. Additionally, 
remember what happened yesterday, remember a phone number and pretend to be 
something else were not found to be significantly different from each other. As a result, 
the mental acts attribute type was split into 2 attribute types, basic mental acts (think 
about something, want something, and play a game) and advanced mental acts (remember 
what happened yesterday, remember a phone number, and pretend to be something else) 
reflecting the patterns of significant and non-significant differences. An illustration 
indicating each entity’s mean percentage of positive responses for the capability to 
perform basic mental acts and advanced mental acts can be found in Figure 1. Thus, for 
the remaining analyses, the data were grouped according to attribute type (emotion, 
senses, sensation, intentional behavior, physical states, basic mental acts, advanced 
mental acts and sense of self), with the presence of a mind and brain as the outcome 
variables.  
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Table 3. Study 1 attribute types most strongly associated with the presence of the mind 
and brain.  
Outcome 
Variable 






Mind Emotion -307.02 1 .000 .68 
 Physical States -186.87 2 .000 .81 
 Intentional Behavior -110.80 3 .000 .88 
 Adv. Mental Acts -100.65 4 .000 .90 
 Senses -93.81 5 .000 .90 
 Sensations -88.59 6 .000 .91 
Brain Senses -414.59 1 .000 .57 
 Sensations -175.09 2 .000 .82 
 Physical States -111.86 3 .000 .88 
 Intentional Behavior -50.57 4 .000 .95 
 Basic Mental Acts -41.66 5 .000 .96 
 Advanced Mental Acts -42.74 6 .000 .96 
      
Note: The related R2 for each attribute type reflects the amount of variance accounted for by the model 
when that attribute type is added to the model containing all of the attribute types above it. 
 
The least-squares likelihood values and associated probability (R2) values for the 
attribute types predicting the presence of a mind and brain are found in Table 3. Using 
HLM, a process similar to step-wise forward logistic regression was used to determine 
the order in which the attribute types were added to the models. With this process, the 
attribute type that contributed the most predictive power to a model at that particular step 
was added next. Results indicated that the presence of a mind was found to be most 
strongly associated with the ability to experience emotion, experience physical states, and 
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engage in intentional behavior, followed by the presence of senses, the ability to engage 
in advanced mental acts, and the ability to experience sensations. Basic mental acts and a 
sense of self were not found to contribute significantly to predicting the presence of a 
mind. This was surprising, particularly for the sense of self. It may be that this result is 
due to participants primarily associating knowledge of what one is (i.e., the sense of self) 
only with human adults. A more encompassing sense of self measure may have revealed 
a stronger association with the mind. The presence of a brain was found to be most 
strongly associated with the presence of senses, sensations and physical states, followed 
by the ability to engage in intentional behavior, basic mental acts and advanced mental 
acts. Emotion and a sense of self were not found to contribute significantly to predicting 
the presence of a brain.  
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Table 4. Odds ratios for the Study 1 models that contain attribute types that contribute to 
predicting the presence of a mind and brain. 
Outcome 
Variable Model Odds Ratio* P-Value 
Mind Six Attribute Type Model1   
  Emotion 3.77 .000 
  Physical States 13.51 .000 
  Intentional Behavior 3.74 .000 
  Adv. Mental Acts 2.92 .000 
  Senses 3.70 .000 
  Sensations 2.80 .000 
 Three Attribute Type Model2   
  Emotion 9.20 .000 
  Physical States 16.76 .000 
  Intentional Behavior 9.19 .000 
     
Brain Six Attribute Type Model1   
  Senses 16.94 .000 
  Sensations 4.70 .000 
  Physical States 8.28 .000 
  Intentional Behavior 3.72 .000 
  Basic Mental Acts 2.89 .000 
  Advanced Mental Acts 2.17 .000 
 Four Attribute Type Model2   
  Senses 29.37 .000 
  Sensations 5.48 .000 
  Physical States 10.29 .000 
  Intentional Behavior 5.24 .000 
     
*Note: These models contain (1) all attribute types that contribute to predicting the presence of a mind and 
brain (6 attribute models) and (2) attribute types that contribute the greatest portion of predictive value 
towards determining the presence of a mind and brain.  
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As can be seen in Table 3, ninety-one percent of the variation for predicting the 
presence of a mind is explained by the full model (i.e., containing all significantly 
predictive variables). For the brain, 96% of the variation is explained by the full model. 
However, there are also what can be considered optimal models for predicting the 
presence of a mind and brain. Eighty-eight percent of the variation for predicting the 
presence of a mind is explained by the model that contains emotion, physical states and 
intentional behavior (3 attribute type model). The addition of advanced mental acts, 
senses and sensations to the 3 attribute type model only explains an additional 1%, 0.5% 
and 0.5% (respectively) of the variation. Ninety-five percent of the variation for 
predicting the presence of a brain is explained by the model that contains senses, 
sensations, physical states and intentional behavior (4 attribute type model). The addition 
of basic mental acts and advanced mental acts to the 4 attribute model only explain an 
additional 1% and 0.5% (respectively) of the variation.2 Odds ratios for each attribute 
type within these models can be found in Table 4. Recall that odds ratios are more 
accurate measures of the predictive contribution of each variable within a model than the 
related R2 values. The odds ratios for each attribute type depend upon which other 
attribute types are within the model. In other words, once in the model, the percentage of 
the variation explained by each attribute type is influenced by which other attribute types 
are also within the model. This can most clearly be seen by the contribution of physical 
states to all four models presented in Table 4. While building the models, physical states 
was found to provide the 2nd and 3rd most predictive capability for the mind and brain, 
respectively. Once within the models, however, physical states was found to provide the 
 
2 It should be noted that percentage of the variation explained by each of these attribute types is specific to 
these models. For example, although the addition of advanced mental states to the 3 attribute model only 
adds 1% additional predictive capability, this does not mean that the addition of advanced mental states to a 
different model would also only add 1% additional predictive capability. How much predictive capability 
will increase with the addition of advanced mental states will depend upon what other variables are already 
in the model. 
 53
most predictive capability for the mind and the 2nd most predictive capability for the 
brain. Thus, when physical states is being used to predict the presence of a mind and a 
brain, the relative predictive influence of physical states increases when there are other 
types of mind and brain related attributes present in the model. 
DISCUSSION 
The primary goals of Study 1 were to provide insight into: (1) how children and 
adults conceptualize robots and computers regarding mind- and brain-related capabilities, 
(2) how children and adults conceptualize the general nature of the mind and its 
capabilities, and (3) what types of attributes children and adults believe an object or 
entity must have in order to claim the object or entity has a mind.   
Conceptualization of intelligent artifacts. As expected, children and adults view 
intelligent artifacts as more animate-like than inanimate objects, but not as animate-like 
as true animate entities. Participants of all ages were more likely to attribute intelligent 
artifacts with a mind and brain than inanimate objects and plants, but less likely to 
attribute a mind and a brain to intelligent artifacts than to people or animals. A similar 
pattern was found with children’s and adults’ views of the specific attributes of intelligent 
artifacts. This indicates that people view intelligent artifacts as lying along an 
animate/inanimate continuum in which they are viewed as neither entirely inanimate 
objects nor social beings. Further, participants’ patterns of responses may indicate that 
intelligent artifacts are viewed as constituting a category of their own. As can be seen in 
Figure 1, where intelligent artifacts are situated in relation to other entities depends upon 
the type of mind- and brain-related questions being asked. When considering the 
capability to perform advanced mental acts, people cluster intelligent artifacts with 
animate entities that have limited capabilities in those areas (e.g., fish, parrots and cats). 
Conversely, when attributing the presence of a mind and brain, and when considering the 
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ability to perform basic mental acts, people view intelligent artifacts as different from all 
other types of entities. However, the possibility that children and adults view intelligent 
artifacts as having their own category is not a certainty. Although the relationship 
between intelligent artifacts and other types of animate and inanimate entities varies 
depending upon the type of questions being asked, it is the capability level of certain 
animates and not intelligent artifacts that varies. It could be argued that in order to 
conclude that intelligent artifacts are truly viewed as their own category, the capability 
levels of intelligent artifacts will need to vary from both animate and inanimate entities, 
depending upon the questions being asked.   
Previous studies have considered the possibility that children attribute mind- and 
brain-related behavior to entities based upon anthropomorphic similarity to humans 
(Schaife & van Duuren, 1995; van Duuren & Schaife, 1996; Johnson, 1990). The results 
of the present study provide some support for this position. Referring again to Figure 1, 
when attributing a mind and brain to various entities, and considering the ability to 
perform basic mental acts, a response pattern emerges that can be construed as signifying 
that these capabilities are influenced by anthropomorphic similarity. Thus, the rock, 
which has the least similarity to humans, is consistently at the lower end of the 
continuum, while grown-up humans are at the highest end. The other entities are ordered 
from lesser to increasing anthropomorphic similarity to humans.  This finding is 
consistent with previous studies (Schaife & van Duuren, 1995; van Duuren & Schaife, 
1996; Johnson, 1990). However, the data from the present study show that 
anthropomorphic similarity is not the only influence on children’s attributions of mind- 
and brain-related behavior. The third scale in Figure 1, depicting perceived capability to 
perform advanced mental acts, indicates that when determining whether an entity can 
engage in advanced mental acts, people cluster intelligent artifacts with animate entities 
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(particularly animals). If anthropomorphic similarity was being used to make this 
judgment, then the intelligent artifacts would be judged as different from and below the 
capabilities of animals. Further, robots and computers were judged as similar to each 
other across all types of attributes. If anthropomorphic similarity determines how 
different entities are judged, then overall, robots’ capabilities should have been judged as 
different from and greater than computers. This indicates that people are not always using 
anthropomorphic similarity in the judgments of various entities.  
General conceptualization of the mind and brain. Adults specified that the mind 
and brain are “different things.” This indicates that by adulthood, people make a clear 
distinction between the mind and brain, paralleling the dualistic philosophical position 
regarding the nature of the mind. Children’s responses, on the other hand, did not show a 
clear pattern. Children of all ages responded to this question randomly. Although it could 
be argued that this indicates that children do not distinguish between the mind and brain, 
there is a more likely explanation. Previous research has found that older children do 
distinguish between the mind and brain (Johnson, 1990). This inconsistency between the 
previous findings and the findings of the present study may be due to methodological 
factors. The question regarding whether the mind and brain are the same or different 
things was always asked at the end of the experimental session. At this point, children 
had already been asked many questions regarding mind- and brain-like capabilities. To 
better hold their attention, children were often told that the session was almost finished 
and that they were going to receive a prize for participating. In their excitement, children 
may simply have responded randomly because they wanted to end the session quickly 
and get their prize. 
Children and adults also differed in their overall willingness to attribute a mind 
and brain to various entities. Consistent with previous studies, 5-year-olds were less 
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willing than older children to claim that entities had a brain. This is consistent with 
previous studies’ findings that 5-year-olds are more stringent in their attribution of a 
brain (Scaife & van Duuren, 1995; van Duuren & Scaife, 1996).  A similar pattern was 
found when attributing a mind, with one exception. Adults were less likely than children 
of all ages to claim that entities had a mind. This is an indication that adults view the 
mind as different from the brain, and, further that, unlike the brain, adults are more 
stringent than children in their attributions of a mind. This may reflect a view that the 
mind is more exclusive to biological, animate entities than the brain. 
Attributes of the mind and brain. Consistent with previous studies, the mind and 
brain were found to have overlapping capabilities. Results indicated that physical states, 
intentional behavior, senses, sensations and advanced mental acts are all predictive of the 
presence of a mind and a brain. Emotion was found to be predictive of the presence of a 
mind, and basic mental acts were found to be predictive of the presence of a brain.  
Although a number of attributes were found to be predictive of both a mind and a brain, 
differences were found regarding which types of attributes are most important for each. 
The presence of a brain was found to be most strongly associated with the ability to 
experience senses, sensations and physical states, followed by the ability to engage in 
intentional behavior, perform basic mental acts and perform advanced mental acts.  The 
presence of a mind was found to be most strongly associated with the ability to 
experience emotion, experience physical states, and engage in intentional behavior, 
followed by the ability to perform advanced mental acts, experience senses, and 
experience sensations. These findings are consistent with Johnson and Wellman’s (1982) 
findings. Senses, sensations and physical states were found to account for 88% of the 
variation for predicting the presence of a brain. As with Johnson and Wellman’s first 
study, this indicates that the brain is more strongly associated with bodily functions than 
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the mind. Emotion, physical states, intentional behavior and advanced mental acts were 
found to account for 90% of the variation for predicting the presence of a mind. With the 
exception of the possible influence of physical states (see below), this can be interpreted 
as indicating that the mind is more strongly associated with more wholly mental acts than 
the brain. This also is consistent with Johnson and Wellman’s findings.  
There is, however, one apparent inconsistency between the present study’s 
findings, and Johnson and Wellman’s (1982) findings. In the Johnson and Wellman 
study, emotion was found to be characteristic of both the presence of a mind and a brain. 
In the present study, although emotion was found to be highly predictive of the presence 
of a mind, it was not found to be predictive of a brain. One explanation for the apparent 
discrepancy between these two sets of findings is that the present study included a larger 
number of attributes. As a result, emotion did not emerge as a strong predictor for the 
presence of the brain relative to these other attributes. Thus, although it may in fact be 
important if included in a smaller set of attributes, its role is not as strong when other 
predictors are available.  
The ability to experience physical states was found to be highly predictive of a 
mind and a brain. However, the importance of physical states in predicting the presence 
of a mind and a brain needs to be interpreted with caution. First, one must consider the 
influence of the types of entities used in the present study. The particular physical states 
used, “go to sleep” and “get sick,” are attributes that are very strongly related to living, 
animate entities. As can be seen in Table 2, there is very little variation in attributions of 
these physical states to people and animals. The pattern of physical states responses 
parallels a pattern of animate/inanimate entities (i.e., people and animals are animate 
entities and received high scores on physical state responses; similarly, rocks and TVs are 
inanimate entities and received low scores on physical states responses). As it is primarily 
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people and animals that are accredited with having a mind and a brain, it is difficult to 
determine whether the predictive strength of physical states found in the present study is 
due to the relationship between physical states and entity type, or between physical states 
and the mind, and physical states and the brain. Second, there is also a question of how 
these physical states were being interpreted by the participants. It can be argued that 
participants may have interpreted “go to sleep” and “get sick” not as physical states, but 
instead as variations of mental states. For example, when a person “go[es] to sleep,” there 
is a change in that person’s mental state. A person goes from being awake and attentive, 
to a state where certain types of mental activity, such as dreams, can take place. Due to 
these issues, a definitive determination regarding the influence of physical states on the 
presence of the mind and brain cannot be made at this time. Instead, a more cautionary 
interpretation is appropriate, asserting that the present study provides support for the 
position that physical states are related to the presence of a mind and a brain, but that 
further studies are needed to fully understand the nature of this relationship.  
Study 1 used intelligent artifacts to help determine the relation between various 
attributes and the presence of a mind.  Although this can provide substantial information, 
it may not be sufficient to completely reveal understanding of the relation between these 
attributes and mind.  By using objects and entities that are familiar to the participants, 
assumptions and information that the participants generally associate with these objects 
and entities likely affect their responses.  Thus, to provide additional information about 
the relation between attributes and the presence of a mind, a second study introduced 
nonexistent entities which were not familiar to the participants. A similar methodology 
was used by Richards and Siegler (1986) to investigate children’s and adults’ 
understanding of attributions of life. 
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Pilot Study 2 
METHOD 
Participants 
Twenty-eight children, 12 younger children (5;0-7;0, M=5;9) and 16 older 
children (8;0-11;10, M=9;5), and 26 adults (30-53, M=41 ) participated in the pilot study. 
Participants were predominantly middle-class and Caucasian, but various ethnic groups 
were represented. 
Materials 
Materials consisted of 12 laminated 8.5x2 inch pieces of paper with 3 phrases 
written on them, 12 4x4 inch pieces of paper with nonsense words on them and 1 8.5x2 
inch piece of paper with “Yes”, “No” and “Can’t Tell” written on it. 
  Procedure 
Children were interviewed individually at the Children's Research Lab. They were 
told that they were going to play a game involving a character who, while on a field trip, 
encountered 12 entities he (or she, if the participant was female) knew nothing about.  It 
was explained that while on this field trip, the character took notes about each of the 
entities he or she encountered, and that the character was really interested in figuring out 
whether each of the entities had a mind or brain.  Children were told that, for each entity, 
they would be presented with the character’s notes both auditorally and visually (using 
text), and asked a number of questions.  It was further explained to them that for each 
question, they could answer “yes,” “no,” or “can’t tell.” These response options were also 
presented both auditorally and visually (using text). 
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Prior to the test scenarios, children were presented with two warm-up tasks.  In 
the first task, children were told that the character encountered a rock and a grown-up 
man.  They were then asked whether the entity “has a brain” (for one entity) and “has a 
mind” (for the other entity).  Children were corrected if they answered incorrectly. 
Pairing of the mind and brain questions with the rock and man was counterbalanced 
between subjects.  In the second warm-up task, children were told (and shown) that the 
character’s notes indicated that a “Morp likes to touch things with its fingertips, it doesn’t 
have any legs and it’s sometimes noisy.”  Children were then asked three questions: (1) 
Do you think a Morp has fingers? (correct answer: yes), (2) Do you think a Morp has a 
tail? (correct answer: can’t tell),  and (3) Do you think a Morp has knees? (correct 
answer: no).  Following children’s response to the third question, children were also 
asked “How can you tell a Morp doesn’t have knees?”  Children’s responses were 
corrected if they answered incorrectly.  The purpose of these warm-up tasks was to 
familiarize children with the interview format and to establish that positive, negative and 
uncertain responses were valued. 
Following the warm-up tasks, children were presented with 12 test scenarios.  In 
each test scenario, children were verbally and visually (with text) presented with the 
nonsense name of the entities encountered and three of the entity’s characteristics.  The 
purpose of this study was to determine which three of four attributes (emotion, desire, 
cognition and self-controlled interaction) had the strongest relation with the presence of a 
mind.  Because of the limited attention span of young children, only a limited number of 
attributes could be investigated. Three attributes was the maximum number that could be 
used and we wanted to select the three most relevant attributes.  
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Table 5. Attribute combinations used in Pilot Study 2. 
 
NEITHER DESIRE 










Interaction  EMOTION 
YES 
Interaction  
No Info Emotion 













No Info ø Desire Cognition 
 
For eleven of the scenarios, the entity was described as having a combination of 
the following capabilities: (1) emotion (happy/glad), (2) cognition (think/pretend), (3) 
desire (want) and (4) self-controlled interaction (playing with other [entities]/working 
with other [entities]). Three of these capabilities (emotion, cognition, and self-controlled 
interaction/volition) were chosen because they have been found to be important to related 
areas of research (e.g., attributions of a brain and life). Desire was included to ascertain 
whether a simpler mental state might be as influential as emotion, cognition and volition. 
A sample scenario might involve the character encountering a Bink that shows emotion 
(is happy), has cognitive capabilities (thinks) and interacts with other Binks (plays with). 
In another test scenario, the character encounters a Jutling which exhibits emotion, is 
white and medium-sized.  Finally, in one of the scenarios (i.e., ø), the entity only 
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exhibited ambiguous characteristics (white, brown or black; tall, medium-sized or short; 
weighs a lot or doesn’t weigh very much)(see Table 5).  
For each scenario, children were asked memory check questions (designed to 
ensure that children remembered the entity’s three characteristics) and the following 5 
test questions: (1) Do you think a [entity] has a heart?, (2) Do you think a [entity] is 
alive?, (3) Do you think a [entity] has a brain?, and (4) Do you think a [entity] has a 
mind? Questions 3 and 4 were counterbalanced between scenarios. The protocol and 
scripts used for the pilot study can be found in Appendix C.     
Pilot Data Results and Conclusions 
To determine which attributes should be included in the main study, scores were 
calculated as follows: (1) a score for each scenario in which the entity possessed a 
particular attribute (emotion, desire, cognition and interaction) was summed for the mind 
and the brain questions (yielding 8 scores), and (2) a score for each scenario in which an 
entity lacked a particular attribute (no emotion, no desire, no cognition and no 
interaction) was calculated for the mind and brain questions (yielding 8 additional 
scores).  For example, for emotion, one score for mind-emotion was calculated by 
summing the “Do you think a [entity] has a mind?” test questions for all scenarios in 
which the entity was described as being capable of experiencing emotion.  A second 
similar score was calculated for not emotion by summing the “Do you think a [entity] has 
a mind?” test questions for all scenarios in which the entity was not described as being 
capable of experiencing emotion. Similarly, one score for brain-desire was calculated by 
summing the “Do you think a [entity] has a brain?” test questions for all scenarios in 
which the entity was described as being capable of experiencing desire, and one was 
calculated for no desire.  See Table 6 for the mean scores for each of these variables.   
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Table 6. Children’s mean scores in Pilot Study 2 for the presence of a mind and brain for 
each attribute  
Attribute Mind Brain 
Cognition - Yes 3.44*1 3.521
Cognition – No Info 3.09*1 3.331
Desire - Yes 3.871 3.701
Desire – No Info 3.581 3.741
Emotion - Yes 5.52*2 5.57*2
Emotion – No Info 4.44*2 4.92*2
Interaction - Yes 5.60*2 5.722
Interaction – No Info 4.89*2 5.432
*   significantly different from its corresponding mind or brain score 
Note 1: out of 4 
Note 2: out of 6 
Four one-way ANOVAs (attribute: present, absent) were conducted for each 
attribute type. Significant differences were found for the presence of a mind for cognition 
(F(1,21)=11.88, p=.002), emotion (F(1,21)=15.04, p=.001) and interaction 
(F(1,21)=12.79, p=.002), and for the presence of a brain for emotion (F(1,21)=9.52, 
p=.006).  Significant differences were not found between desire and no desire scenarios 
for either the mind or brain.  As a result, desire was eliminated from the main study.   
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Table 7. Children’s mean scores in Pilot Study 2 for the presence of a mind 
Attribute Younger Children Older Children 
Cognition - Yes 2.781 3.811
Cognition – No Info 2.191 3.571
Desire - Yes 3.251 4.201
Desire – No Info 2.831 4.001
Emotion - Yes 4.382 5.132
Emotion – No Info 3.442 5.002
Interaction - Yes 4.782 5.062
Interaction – No Info 3.382 5.702
Note 1: out of 4 
Note 2: out of 6 
Main effects of age were also found for determination of the presence of a mind 
for cognition (F(1,21)=7.26, p<.01), emotion (F(1,21)=7.49, p<.01), desire 
(F(1,21)=5.92, p<.05) and interaction (F(1,21)=7.49, p<.01). Mean scores can be found 
in Table 7.  These results are consistent with previous studies which have found that older 
children are more flexible than younger children in attributing more human-like 
characteristics to various types of entities (Nigam & Klahr, 1999; Scaife & van Duuren, 
1995; van Duuren & Scaife, 1996).   
Suggested Changes  
A number of changes for Study 2 were implemented.  First, questions about desire 
were eliminated.  This allowed the inclusion of the entities with ambiguous and inanimate 
characteristics (see below).  In the pilot study, only one of the twelve scenarios did not 
involve an attribute that was believed to be associated with the mind.  This may have 
caused children to be more likely to claim that everything had a mind.  By limiting the 
number of attributes used, thereby allowing the inclusion of more scenarios in which the 
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entity does not have a characteristic commonly associated with the mind, Study 2 has a 
more balanced and cleaner methodology. This makes it easier to detect, and possibly 
eliminate, any response biases that may be present. 
The second change was to eliminate the memory check questions for each entity’s 
characteristics. This was done primarily to shorten the study, as children tended to lose 
attention toward the end. In the pilot study, children of all ages were able to answer the 
memory check questions without any difficulty.  In addition, this information is available 
to the children in written form during the entire scenario and question period.  In fact, a 
number of children pointed out the availability of the answers to the experimenter when 
asked the memory check questions. 
The third change involved shortening the introduction to the study.  In the pilot 
study, children tended to get fidgety and bored during the introduction.  As a result, they 




Participants were 75 children, 29 5-year-olds (5;0 – 5;11, M = 5;7, 13 males, 16  
females), 24 8-year-olds (7;11 – 8;11, M = 8;5, 9 males, 15  females) and 21 11-year-
olds(11;0 – 11;11, M = 11;5, 8 males, 13  females).  The age groups that were chosen for 
participation in this study were based upon Johnson and Wellman’s (1982) findings that 
indicated that school-aged children are in a transitional period regarding their 
understanding of the mind and brain. Participants were predominantly middle-class and 
Caucasian, but various ethnic groups were represented. 
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Materials 
Materials consisted of 12 laminated 8.5x2 inch pieces of paper with 3 phrases 
written on them, 12 4x4 inch pieces of paper with nonsense words on them and 1 8.5x2 
inch piece of paper with “Yes”, “No” and “Can’t Tell” written on it, 12 pieces of paper 
with images of a boy in various backgrounds, and 12 pieces of paper with images of a girl 
in various backgrounds. 
Table 8. Test scenario-attribute combinations used in Study 2. 
COGNITION 
























No Info Ambiguous Cognition Inanimate 
 
Procedure 
The protocol for Study 2 was the same as that for the 2nd pilot study with a few 
exceptions. First, questions about desire were eliminated, allowing the inclusion of 
entities with ambiguous and inanimate characteristics. Thus, the 12 test scenarios for 
Study 2 were as follows. For seven of the scenarios, the entity was described as having a 
combination of the following capabilities: (1) emotion (happy/glad), (2) cognition 
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(think/pretend), and (3) self-controlled interaction (playing with other [entities]/working 
with other [entities]).  In three of the scenarios, the entity only exhibited ambiguous 
characteristics (white, brown or black; tall, medium-sized or short; weighs a lot or 
doesn’t weigh very much). These were included to determine whether children have a 
bias towards attributing a mind when they lack any relevant information. In two 
additional scenarios, the entity exhibited one of two blatantly inanimate properties (made 
of metal/made of plastic).  These were included as a control against yes response bias, as 
children should clearly respond no to these questions. The 12 combinations of 
capabilities for the 12 test scenarios used in Study 2 can be found in Table 8. The 
presentation order of the scenarios was randomized between subjects.  The two other 
changes from the 2nd pilot study were: (1) the memory check questions for each test 
scenario were eliminated, and (2) the introduction to the study was significantly 
shortened. 
RESULTS 
Hierarchical Generalized Linear Models (HGLM) were used to analyze the Study 
2 data.  The use of HGLM is an appropriate modeling framework for multilevel data with 
nonlinear structural models and nonnormally distributed errors (Raudenbush & Bryk, 
2002). The data in the present study is nominal-scale, multinomial categorical data, 
which fits suitably in the HGLM framework. Recall that the most informative manner of 
reporting HGLM results is using Odds Ratios. An odds ratio (OR) indicates whether the 
probability of a certain event (or in our case, a certain response) is statistically equivalent 
for two groups. An OR of 1 indicates that the probability of an event is equally likely in 
two groups. An OR significantly greater than or less than 1 indicates that an event is 
more likely in one of the groups than the other (Pocket dictionary of statistics, 2001). 
 68
No significant differences were found for sex. Therefore the data were grouped 
according to age group and scenario type (Inanimate, Ambiguous, CEI (cognition, 
emotion and interaction), CE (cognition and emotion), CI (cognition and interaction), C 
(cognition), EI (emotion and interaction), E (emotion) and I (interaction) (see Table 8)), 
with the presence of a mind and brain as the outcome variables. Three additional scenario 
types were created (using dummy variables) to determine whether the number of 
variables alone would yield significantly different responses. These additional scenarios 
were: (1) OneVar, which included responses to the cognition (C), emotion (E) and 
interaction (I) scenarios, (2) TwoVar, which included the cognition and emotion (CE), 
cognition and interaction (CI), and emotion and interaction (EI) scenarios, and (3) 
ThreeVar, which only included the cognition, emotion and interaction (CEI) scenarios. 
The purpose of using these additional scenario types was to determine whether children 
were sensitive to merely the number of relevant attributes within the scenarios versus the 
specific attributes themselves. 
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Table 9. Significant odds ratios for the Study 2 scenario comparisons predicting the 
presence of a Brain. 
Scenario Comparisons Odds Ratio P-Value 
Cognition & Emotion vs. Emotion .17 <.01 
 Cognition .26 <.05 
 Interaction .20 <.01 
Cognition & Interaction vs. Emotion .25 <.01 
 Interaction .30 <.01 
 Cognition .39 .07 
Cognition, Emotion & 
Interaction vs. Emotion .21 <.01 
 Cognition .25 <.05 
 Interaction .02 <.01 
 Emotion & Interaction .46 .07 
Inanimate vs. OneVar .02 <.01 
 TwoVar .01 <.01 
 ThreeVar .004 <.01 
Ambiguous vs. OneVar .12 <.01 
 TwoVar .04 <.01 
 ThreeVar .04 <.01 
OneVar vs. TwoVar 2.89 <.01 
 ThreeVar 3.82 <.01 
Attributions of a Brain. Significant differences were found between scenario type. 
As was previously stated, the original scenario types used in this study were as follows: 
Inanimate, Ambiguous, CEI (cognition, emotion and interaction), CE (cognition and 
emotion), CI (cognition and interaction), C (cognition), EI (emotion and interaction), E 
(emotion) and I (interaction) (see Table 8). Results indicated that children were 
significantly less likely to attribute a brain to an entity in the Inanimate scenario than all 
of the other original scenarios, and in the Ambiguous scenario than all other original 
scenarios (all p<.01). Further, children were significantly more likely to attribute a brain 
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to an entity in the CE scenario than the E, C, and I scenarios, the CI scenario than the E 
and I scenarios, and the CEI scenario than the E, C, and I scenarios. Finally, there were 
trends toward children being more likely to attribute a brain to an entity in the CEI 
scenario than the EI scenario, and the CI than the C scenario (see Table 9 for odds ratios 
and p-values). 
Results also indicated that children were significantly less likely to attribute a 
brain to an entity in the Inanimate scenario than in the OneVar, TwoVar, or ThreeVar 
scenarios. Children were also significantly less likely to attribute a brain to an entity in 
the Ambiguous scenario than in the OneVar, TwoVar, or ThreeVar scenarios. Finally, 
children were significantly less likely to attribute a brain to an entity in the OneVar than 
in the TwoVar or ThreeVar scenarios (see Table 9 for odds ratios and p-values).  
Table 10. Odds ratios for the Study 2 response comparisons (“Can’t Tell” vs. [Response]) 
predicting the presence of a mind and brain. 
Attribute Age Comparisons  Response 
Odds 
Ratio P-Value 
Brain 5-year-olds vs. 8-year-olds Yes 7.33 <.01 
   No .17 <.01 
  11-year-olds Yes 4.97 <.01 
   No .22 <.01 
Mind 5-year-olds vs. 8-year-olds Yes 2.89 <.05 
   No .38 <.05 
  11-year-olds Yes 3.34 <.01 
   No .25 <.01 
Significant differences were found between age groups regarding the use of “can’t 
tell” as a response to questions, but not regarding “yes” and “no” responses. When 
determining whether an entity had a brain, 5-year-olds were significantly less likely than 
8- and 11-year-olds to respond to questions using “can’t tell” (see Table 10).  Another 
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way of expressing these findings ((1-OR)*100) is that 8-year-olds are 634% more likely 
than 5-year-olds to respond that they “can’t tell” whether something has a brain when 
those responses are compared to their “yes” responses, and 83% more likely to respond 
that they “can’t tell” whether an entity has a brain when those responses are compared to 
their “no” responses.  Eleven-year-olds are 90% more likely than 5-year-olds to respond 
that they “can’t tell” whether something has a brain when those responses are compared 
to their “yes” responses, and 78% more likely to respond that they “can’t tell” whether an 
entity has a brain when those responses are compared to their “no” responses. Means and 
standard deviations of the attributes can be found in Table 11. 
Table 11. Means and standard deviations for Study 2 attributes. 
Attribute Mind* Brain* 
Cognition1 3.74(0.98) 3.85(1.12) 
Emotion1  3.86(1.26) 3.88(1.20) 
Interaction1  3.92(1.27) 3.79(1.28) 
Ambiguous2  3.13(1.83) 3.12(1.86) 
Inanimate3 0.44(0.75) 0.51(0.88) 
OneVar2  2.92(1.12) 2.84(1.15) 
TwoVar2  2.91(0.88) 2.88(0.88) 
ThreeVar4  0.93(0.41) 0.97(0.37) 
* Keep in mind that because the data is categorical, means are not used in the analyses. 
Note 1: out of 8 
Note 2: out of 6 
Note 3: out of 4 
Note 4: out of 2 
Attributions of a Mind. Results indicated that children were significantly less 
likely to attribute a mind to an entity in the Inanimate scenario than all of the other 
original scenarios, and in the Ambiguous scenario than all other original scenarios (all 
p<.01). Further, children were significantly more likely to attribute a mind to an entity in 
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the CE scenario than the E, the CI scenario than the E and I scenarios, and the CEI 
scenario than the E and I scenarios. Finally, there were trends towards children being 
more likely to attribute a mind to an entity in the CE scenario than the I and EI scenarios, 
and the CI than the EI scenario (see Table 12 for odds ratios and p-values). 
Table 12. Significant odds ratios for the Study 2 scenario comparisons predicting the 
presence of a mind. 
Scenario Comparisons Odds Ratio P-Value 
Cognition & Emotion vs. Emotion .25 <.01 
 Interaction .38 .07 
 Emotion & Interaction .46 .08 
Cognition & Interaction vs. Emotion .21 <.05 
 Interaction .13 <.01 
 Emotion & Interaction .29 .07 
Cognition, Emotion & 
Interaction vs. Emotion .32 <.05 
 Interaction .20 <.01 
Inanimate vs. OneVar .02 <.01 
 TwoVar .14 <.01 
 ThreeVar .01 <.01 
Ambiguous vs. OneVar .02 <.01 
 TwoVar .01 <.01 
 ThreeVar .01 <.01 
OneVar vs. TwoVar .49 <.01 
 ThreeVar .38 <.05 
Results also indicated that children were significantly less likely to attribute a 
mind to an entity in the Inanimate scenario than the OneVar, TwoVar, or ThreeVar 
scenarios. Children were also significantly less likely to attribute a mind to an entity in 
the Ambiguous scenario than OneVar, TwoVar, or ThreeVar scenarios. Finally, children 
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were significantly less likely to attribute a mind to an entity in the OneVar than the 
TwoVar or ThreeVar scenarios (see Table 12 for odds ratios and p-values).  
Significant age differences were also found in the determination of the presence 
of the mind.  Five-year-olds were significantly less likely than 8- and 11-year-olds to 
respond to questions using “can’t tell” (see Table 10). Another way of expressing these 
findings is that 8-year-olds are 189% more likely than 5-year-olds to respond that they 
“can’t tell” whether something has a mind when those responses are compared to their 
“yes” responses, and 62% more likely to respond that they “can’t tell” whether an entity 
has a mind when those responses are compared to their “no” responses. Eleven-year-olds 
are 247% more likely than 5-year-olds to respond that they “can’t tell” whether 
something has a mind when those responses are compared to their “yes” responses, and 
75% more likely to respond that they “can’t tell” whether an entity has a mind when 
those responses are compared to their “no” responses. Means and standard deviations of 
the attributes can be found in Table 11. 
DISCUSSION 
Children of all ages clearly differentiated between various types of scenarios. The 
following discussion is structured around five main questions of interest: (1) Are children 
more likely to ascribe a mind or brain to an entity for which they lack any relevant 
information about that entity as compared to an entity that exhibits clearly inanimate 
characteristics?, (2) Are children more likely to ascribe a mind or brain to an entity that 
exhibits cognitive, emotional or interactive capabilities than a clearly inanimate entity or 
an entity for which they lack any relevant information?, (3) When considering the role of 
cognition, emotion and interaction in attributing a mind or brain to an entity, do children 
consider the presence of one of those characteristics more important than the others?, (4) 
Are children more likely to ascribe a mind or brain to an entity as the number of 
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mind/brain-related capabilities the entity exhibits increases?, and (5) When the number of 
mind/brain-related capabilities that an entity exhibits does increase, do children’s 
ascriptions of the presence of a mind or brain depend upon whether the added capability 
is cognition, emotion or interaction?  
When children were unfamiliar with an entity and lacked knowledge of that 
entity’s mind/brain-related capabilities (i.e., the entity’s description only contained 
ambiguous characteristics such as white and medium sized), children were more likely to 
claim that the entity had a mind and brain than when an entity exhibited clearly inanimate 
characteristics (e.g., made of plastic). This indicates that when children lack relevant 
mind/brain-related information about an unknown entity, they do not automatically 
assume that the entity is inanimate and does not have a mind or brain. Instead, they seem 
to take a stance that is consistent with the belief that this unknown entity might possibly 
have a mind or brain. This stance, however, is not equivalent to assuming that an 
unknown entity does in fact have a mind or brain. Children were more likely to claim that 
an entity exhibiting basic cognition, emotion or interaction capabilities (i.e., the entity 
was described as having one mind/brain-related capability) had a mind and brain than 
that an entity for which they lacked relevant knowledge had a mind and brain (i.e., the 
entity’s description only contained ambiguous characteristics ), . Thus, it seems that 
whereas children believe that unfamiliar inanimate entities do not have a mind or brain, 
and unfamiliar entities which exhibit mind/brain-related capabilities are more likely to 
have a mind and brain, children seem to take a more moderate ‘just-in-case’ attitude 
towards unfamiliar entities which only exhibit ambiguous characteristics.  
Children do seem to consider cognition, emotion and interaction as indicators of 
the presence of a mind and brain.  However, although children do seem to believe that 
each of these capabilities alone makes it more likely that an entity has a mind and brain, 
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children do not seem to believe that any one of these three capabilities is more indicative 
of the presence of a mind and brain. Children were equally likely to claim that an 
unfamiliar entity had a mind and brain when that entity exhibited cognition, emotion or 
interaction. There is also some evidence that children may believe that as the number of 
mind/brain-related capabilities an entity exhibits increases, the probability that the entity 
has a mind and brain also increases. Children were more likely to claim that an unfamiliar 
entity had a mind and brain when that entity exhibited two or three mind/brain-related 
capabilities than when the entity only exhibited one mind/brain-related capability (e.g., 
cognition and emotion vs. emotion alone).  
Older children (8- and 11-year-olds) in this study were more likely to claim that 
they were not provided sufficient information to determine whether the mind and brain 
were present (i.e., responding “can’t tell:”) than were younger children (5-year-olds). 
This can be interpreted in one of three ways. First, it may be, as previous studies have 
indicated, that 5-year-olds are more inflexible when it comes to attributing a brain or 
brain-related capabilities (and in our case, a mind) than older children. Younger children 
simply may not be as willing as older children to consider that an entity might have 
human-like characteristics unless they are more certain of that entity’s similarity to 
humans. Alternately, it may be that 5-year-olds are less willing to respond that they 
“can’t tell” whether they have sufficient information to make a decision due to issues of 
cognitive complexity. It may be more difficult for 5-year-olds than older children to 
reason about having a lack of sufficient information to make a decision regardless of the 
context. Although the 2nd warm-up task presented to children attempted to reduce the 
probability that this issue would be problematic, it may be that the use of one warm-up 
task to address this was not sufficient. Finally, it may be that 5-year-olds are less 
knowledgeable about the mind and brain than older children, limiting their ability to 
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determine when they do not have sufficient information to make this decision. If this is 
the case, then 5-year-olds’ criteria to determine whether something has a mind or brain 
may be simpler than older children’s criteria to make this decision. As a result, 5-year-
olds may require less information than older children to make this determination, making 
it less likely that they will respond that they do not have sufficient information. 
 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The present studies investigated what types of attributes children and adults 
believe an object or entity must have in order to claim that the object or entity has a mind. 
This provides insight into children’s and adults’  generalized conception of the mind, 
including beliefs about what the mind is, what it can do, and what sort of entities have 
minds. Results indicate that children and adults have multifaceted beliefs about the mind, 
and that, although there is some overlap, these beliefs differ from those about the brain. 
Further, beliefs about the mind develop over time, with different aspects of these beliefs 
developing at different times. Finally, the results provide evidence that the  importance of 
attributes associated with determining whether something has a mind varies depending 
upon the specific type of entity or mind-related attribute being investigated. 
Previous research has often treated the presence of mental state capabilities, such 
as thinking, as synonymous with having a mind. However, children’s and adults’ beliefs 
about the mind are much more complicated than this “thinking = mind” equation. The 
current studies have found that although mental state capabilities are an important aspect 
of children’s and adults’ beliefs about the mind, the presence of mental state capabilities 
alone are not necessarily synonymous with having a mind. Both Study 1 and Study 2 
show that in addition to cognitive acts, emotion and volition (e.g., intentional behavior) 
are predictive of the presence of a mind. Further, Study 1 found that physical states, 
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senses and sensations are also important predictive factors. Importantly, Study 1 provided 
evidence that the complexity of the particular type of attribute being used to reason about 
the mind is also significant. Recall from Study 1 that advanced mental acts, but not basic 
mental acts, were predictive of the presence of a mind. Although not assessed for in the 
present studies, it is likely that this difference in complexity is also significant for the 
predictive power of other types of attributes. Finally, the relative level of predictive 
importance for various types of attributes depends upon which other attributes are present 
in the situation. In Study 1, for example, emotion was found to be the most predictive of 
the presence of a mind. How much predictive value emotion had in determining the 
presence of a mind, however, depended upon which other attributes were also being 
considered. Thus, when emotion, physical states and intentional behavior were present in 
the model, the predictive value of emotion was greater than when emotion, physical 
states, intentional behavior, advance mental acts, senses and sensations were all present 
(see Table 4).  
In sum, this indicates that children and adults do not use a simple formula for 
determining whether something does or does not have a mind. There appears to be 
specific types of attributes that are predictive of having a mind, but how predictive each 
type of attribute is depends upon the specific situation being reasoned about. Thus, we 
can conclude that cognition, emotion, volition, physical states, senses and sensations are 
all predictors of the presence of a mind, but which type of attribute is most predictive 
depends upon the context of the situation (i.e., what other types of attributes are present).  
Quite often, researchers have discussed the mind and brain as if they are 
interchangeable. Consistent with Johnson and Wellman’s (1982) findings, the current 
findings indicate that this may not be appropriate. Johnson & Wellman found that 
although there is overlap between children’s beliefs about the mind and brain, children 
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consider the mind and brain as separate entities. Further, they found that children 
associate the mind and brain most strongly with different types of attributes. Although 
both the mind and brain were associated with mental and emotional acts, the brain was 
found to be most strongly associated with bodily acts, whereas the mind was more 
associated with mental acts. The present studies’ findings are consistent with this. The 
results indicated that children and adults believe that the mind and brain have overlapping 
capabilities. In both Study 1 and Study 2, children and adults associated both the mind 
and brain with cognitive and volitional acts. Children in Study 2 also associated both the 
mind and brain with emotion. Even so, children’s and adults’ beliefs about the mind and 
brain were found to be different in some ways. In Study 1, when attributes related to 
bodily acts (i.e., senses and sensations) were included, the types of attributes most 
predictive of the presence of a brain were those that can be considered bodily acts. This 
was not the case when determining the presence of a mind. Even with the inclusion of 
attributes related to bodily acts, the types of attributes most predictive of the presence of a 
mind were those that can be considered more “mental” (i.e., emotion, volition, and 
advanced mental acts). This tells us that children and adults do consider the mind and 
brain as related, but still different from each other. 
An important aspect of children’s and adults’ beliefs about the mind is 
determining how these beliefs develop and change over time. Previous studies that have 
investigated children’s beliefs about the mind (Johnson & Wellman, 1982) and brain 
(Johnson & Wellman, 1982; Scaife & van Duuren, 1995; van Duuren & Scaife, 1996; 
Johnson, 1990; Gottfried et al., 1999) have provided evidence that school-aged children 
are in a transitional period in which their beliefs about the mind and brain are still 
developing. The current studies provide support for this position. In both Study 1 and 
Study 2, 5-year-olds’ patterns of responses were found to be different from those of older 
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children and adults in attributing the presence of a mind and brain. In previous studies, 
young children were consistently found to be less likely than older children and adults to 
attribute human-like characteristics to different types of entities (Nigam & Klahr, 1999; 
Scaife & van Duuren, 1995; van Duuren & Scaife, 1996). Similar to these previous 
studies, 5-year-olds in Study 1 and Study 2 were less likely than older children to 
attribute a brain to an entity. Five-year-olds’ in Study 2 were also found to be less likely 
to attribute a mind to an entity than were older children. It appears from these findings 
that development involves becoming more likely to attribute a mind and brain to various 
entities as one gets older. However, adults in Study 1 were found to be less likely than 
children to attribute a mind to different entities. This indicates that, with regard to 
attributing a mind, additional changes take place between age 11 and adulthood, possibly 
with children older than 11 and adults viewing the mind as more uniquely human than the 
brain. Further, this may be linked to a greater differentiation between the mind and brain 
in adults. 
Finally, the results provide evidence that the importance of attributes associated 
with determining whether something has a mind varies depending upon the specific type 
of entity or mind-related attribute being investigated. Some researchers have suggested 
that children, and sometimes adults, use anthropomorphic similarity to humans when 
making attributions of mental capabilities (Carey, 1985; Inagaki & Hatano, 1987; Inagaki 
& Hatano, 1999; Inagaki & Sugiyama, 1988; Montgomery, 1994). As can be seen in 
Figure 1, the current findings do not entirely support this conclusion. A pattern of 
response similar to judgments based on anthropomorphic similarity can be seen for 
certain types of attributions, such as determining the presence of a mind or brain. 
However, for other types of attributions, such the ability to perform advanced mental 
acts, the pattern of response is markedly dissimilar from a pattern based on 
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anthropomorphic similarity. If it was the case that people were basing their judgments of 
mental capabilities entirely on anthropomorphic similarity, then these disparate patterns 
of responses would not exist, and attributions of all types of mental capabilities would 
have the same pattern of responses. More specifically, if children and adults were truly 
using anthropomorphic similarity on which to base their judgments, the advanced mental 
capabilities would reflect the same anthropomorphic pattern, as advanced mental 
capabilities are more human-like than are basic mental capabilities. Thus, it seems 
unlikely that children or adults are basing their judgments of mental capabilities on 
anthropomorphic similarities.  
The current studies expand our knowledge regarding children’s and adults’ theory 
of mind. Nevertheless, further studies into children’s and adults’ beliefs about the mind 
are necessary as there are still many unanswered questions. For example, further studies 
looking at basic versus advanced levels of the various types of attributes are needed. The 
current studies provide evidence that advanced mental acts are more strongly associated 
with the mind than the brain. It may be that the same pattern holds true for other types of 
attributes, such as volition or emotion. Another question of interest that should be 
pursued concerns the potential effect of technology on children’s and adults’ beliefs 
about the nature of the mind. It may be that, as Turkle (1984, 1991, 1998, 2000a, 200b) 
suggested, technological advances and more exposure to technology will change people’s 
beliefs about the nature of the mind. For example, longitudinal studies should be 
undertaken investigating children’s and adults’ generalized beliefs about the mind in 
relation to the types of technology they encounter on a regular basis. In addition, other 
possible influences regarding whether or not children and adults will attribute a mind to 
an entity should be investigated. For example, the effect of different physical 
characteristics of the entities should be investigated. It may be, for example, that people 
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will be more likely to attribute a mind to unknown entities that exhibit physical 
characteristics of animates such as soft, curved lines, as opposed to those typically found 
in inanimates such as straight, sharp lines (Johnson, Booth & O’Hearn, 2001). Finally, an 
important area of future research is to investigate the actually direction and reasoning 
process that children and adults engage in when thinking about the presence of a mind 
and brain, and the presence of related attributes.  Although the current findings 
investigate the relationship between various types of attributes and the presence of the 
mind and brain, the exact process or direction of children’s and adults’ reasoning about 
these issues is not explored. Research into these and other issues will lead to a greater 
understanding of children’s and adults’ beliefs about the mind, and how those beliefs are 





Pilot Study 1 protocol. 
General Questions 
1. Where is your foot?    Foot  Other: ______________ 
What kinds of things can you do with your foot? 
2. Where is your heart?    Chest  Other: ______________ 
What kinds of things can your heart do? 
3. Where is your brain?    Head  Other: ______________ 
What kinds of things can you do with your brain? 
If I opened up your head, would I be able to see or touch your brain?   Yes No 
4. Where is your mind?  Head  Other: ______________ 
What kinds of things can you do with your mind? 
If I opened up your head, would I be able to see or touch your mind?   Yes No 
Sorting Task 1 
Now I’m going to ask you about what different kinds of people, animals and 
things can do.  I have some cards with pictures on them. I need to make sure you know 
what each picture is before we start, so when I show you each picture, just tell me what it 
is…[show each picture and ask what each is: grown-up, kid, baby, parrot, cat, fish, 
flower, rock, TV, robot and computer] 
I’m going to ask you which ones can do certain things.  What you’ll do is put 
those that can do what I ask you about in this box (CAN box) and those that can not do 
what I ask you about in this box (CAN NOT box).   
Let’s practice one.  I’ll do a few first, and then you can do some.  My first 
question is: “Which ones can walk all by themselves?” 
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Let’s see, grown-ups can walk all by themselves, so I’ll put the grown-up in the 
CAN box. 
Rocks can’t walk all by themselves, so I’ll put the rock in the CAN NOT box. 
Now you try it [hand the child the kid, cat, fish  and flower picture]—prompt & 
correct if needed  
Great!  Let’s get started. 
[For each Q, mix the order of the cards and hand them to the child.  On the 
response form, circle the items placed in the can box] 
 
Which ones can Feel Happy? 
Grown-up Kid Baby Parrot Cat Fish Flower Rock TV Robot Computer 
 
Which ones can Feel Proud? 
Grown-up Kid Baby Parrot Cat Fish Flower Rock TV Robot Computer 
 
Which ones can See Things? 
Grown-up Kid Baby Parrot Cat Fish Flower Rock TV Robot Computer 
 
Which ones can Say Things? 
Grown-up Kid Baby Parrot Cat Fish Flower Rock TV Robot Computer 
 
You know how when you walk into a hot room you feel hot? 
Which ones can Feel Hot? 
Grown-up Kid Baby Parrot Cat Fish Flower Rock TV Robot Computer 
 
Which ones can Feel Hurt If They Fall on the Floor? 
Grown-up Kid Baby Parrot Cat Fish Flower Rock TV Robot Computer 
 
Which ones can Do Something Just Because They Want To? 
Grown-up Kid Baby Parrot Cat Fish Flower Rock TV Robot Computer 
 
Which ones can Sometimes Be Naughty? 
Grown-up Kid Baby Parrot Cat Fish Flower Rock TV Robot Computer 
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Which ones can Go To Sleep? 
Grown-up Kid Baby Parrot Cat Fish Flower Rock TV Robot Computer 
 
Which ones can Get Sick? 
Grown-up Kid Baby Parrot Cat Fish Flower Rock TV Robot Computer 
 
Self-Knowledge Questions 
Now I’m going to ask you about what each of these know about.   
Here’s a grown-up.  Do grown-ups know that they are grown-ups? Yes  No 
Here’s a kid.  Do kids know that they are kids?    Yes  No 
Here’s a baby.  Do babies know that they are babies?   Yes  No 
Here’s a parrot.  Do parrots know that they are parrots?   Yes  No 
Here’s a cat.  Do cats know that they are cats?    Yes  No 
Here’s a fish.  Do fish know that they are fish?    Yes  No 
Here’s a flower.  Do flowers know that they are flowers?   Yes  No 
Here’s a rock.  Do rocks know that they are rocks?    Yes  No 
Here’s a TV.  Do TVs know that they are TVs?    Yes  No 
Here’s a robot.  Do robots know that they are robots?   Yes  No 
Here’s a computer.  Do computers know that they are computers?  Yes  No 
Sorting Task 2 
I just have a few more questions about what different kinds of people, animals 
and things can do.  Just like before, we’re going to use the CAN and CAN NOT boxes.  
Remember, what you’ll do is put those that can do what I ask you about in this box 
(CAN box) and those that can not do what I ask you about in this box (CAN NOT box). 
 
Which ones can Think about Something? 
Grown-up Kid Baby Parrot Cat Fish Flower Rock TV Robot Computer 
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Which ones can Play a Game? 
Grown-up Kid Baby Parrot Cat Fish Flower Rock TV Robot Computer 
 
Which ones can Remember a Phone Number? 
Grown-up Kid Baby Parrot Cat Fish Flower Rock TV Robot Computer 
 
Which ones can Remember What Happened Yesterday? 
Grown-up Kid Baby Parrot Cat Fish Flower Rock TV Robot Computer 
 
Which ones can Want Something? 
Grown-up Kid Baby Parrot Cat Fish Flower Rock TV Robot Computer 
 
Which ones can Pretend to Be Something Else? 
Grown-up Kid Baby Parrot Cat Fish Flower Rock TV Robot Computer 
 
Which ones Are Alive? 
Grown-up Kid Baby Parrot Cat Fish Flower Rock TV Robot Computer 
 
Which ones Have A Brain? 
Grown-up Kid Baby Parrot Cat Fish Flower Rock TV Robot Computer 
 
Which ones Have A Mind? 
Grown-up Kid Baby Parrot Cat Fish Flower Rock TV Robot Computer 
 
 
Is the mind and brain the same thing or different things? Same  Different 
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Appendix B. 
Pilot Study 1 parent questionnaire. 
Instructions:  Please answer the following as accurately as possible.  Keep in mind 
that there are no right or wrong answers. 
Child’s Experience 
Does your child have access to a personal computer? ٱ Yes  ٱ No 
(for example, a PC or Mac) 
If yes,  
In which is this computer located?  ٱ Home ٱ School ٱ Other 
  (select all that apply) 
 
Overall, how often does your child use the computer? 
 Multiple ٱ
times a day 
 Once a ٱ
day 




  times 3-2 ٱ
a month 














 __________ :Other ٱ
 









 __________ :Other ٱ
 
Has your child ever taken a computer class?   ٱ Yes  ٱ No 
If yes, what type of class(es)? 
_________________________________________________ 
 
Does your child own any “intelligent” electronic toys such as furbies or robots? ٱ Yes ٱ No 
(i.e., toys that can learn new things, are programmable, etc.) 
If yes, 
What “intelligent” electronic toys does your child own? _________________________ 
How long has your child had this toy(s)?    __________ 
Overall, how often does your child play with this toy? 
 Multiple ٱ
times a day 
 Once a ٱ
day 




  times 3-2 ٱ
a month 





Do you think your child believes this toy is alive?    ٱ Yes  ٱ No  
If yes, please list some examples of why you believe this: 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Does your child interact with this intelligent toy differently  
from the way they interact with other toys?     ٱ Yes  ٱ No  
If yes, please list some examples of how: 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Parent’s Computer Experience 
Do you have access to a computer?  ٱ Yes  ٱ No 
If yes,  
In which is this computer located?   ٱ Home ٱ School ٱ Other__________ 
  (select all that apply) 
 
What type of Internet connection do you have?   
 Cable Modem ٱ DSL ٱ Dial-up ٱ
(RoadRunner) 
 ___________ :Other ٱ
 
Overall, how often do you use a computer? 
 Multiple ٱ
times a day 
 Once ٱ 
a day 
  Every ٱ 
2-3 days 
 Once ٱ 
a week 
  times 3-2 ٱ
a month 
 Once a ٱ 
month 
 /Rarely ٱ 
Never 
 






























What is your proficiency with computers? 
 Expert/Professional ٱ Advanced ٱ Intermediate ٱ Beginner ٱ
(e.g., Programmer) 
 
Your spouse/partner/other older household member’s computer experience: 
Does another older individual in your household have access to a computer?   
 No ٱ Yes ٱ
If yes,  
Who is this other household member (e.g., spouse, sibling, etc.)? 
_____________________ 
In which is this computer located?   ٱ Home ٱ School ٱ Other: __________ 
Overall, how often does your other older household member use a computer? 
 /Rarely ٱ Once a ٱ   times 3-2 ٱ Once ٱ  Every ٱ Once a ٱ Multiple ٱ
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times a day day 2-3 days a week a month month Never 
 















Of the above, which does your other older household member spend the most time doing 















What is your other older household member’s proficiency with computers? 









































































































You know how when you walk into a hot room you feel hot? 


























































































































































































































































































































































































Do grown-ups know that they are grown-ups?  ٱ Yes  ٱ No 
Do kids know that they are kids?     ٱ Yes  ٱ No 
Do babies know that they are babies?    ٱ Yes  ٱ No 
Do parrots know that they are parrots?    ٱ Yes  ٱ No 
Do cats know that they are cats?     ٱ Yes  ٱ No 
Do fish know that they are fish?     ٱ Yes  ٱ No 
Do flowers know that they are flowers?    ٱ Yes  ٱ No 
Do rocks know that they are rocks?     ٱ Yes  ٱ No 
Do TVs know that they are TVs?     ٱ Yes  ٱ No 
Do robots know that they are robots?    ٱ Yes  ٱ No 
Do computers know that they are computers?   ٱ Yes  ٱ No 
 





Study 2 protocol. 
 Today, we’re going to play a game.  In this game, there’s a boy named Alex who 
loves going new places and learning new things.  For our game today, we’re going to talk 
about a fieldtrip that Alex went on.  While he was on his trip, he took notes about all sorts 
of people, animals and things that he’d never seen before.  What he was really interested 
in was figuring out whether the new things he saw had a mind or a brain. Let me show 
you what I mean. 
 
Note: Each child is only asked about either the rock or the grown-up man. 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 Alex saw a rock.  Let me ask you… 
  Would Alex say that a rock has a brain?  Yes  No 
  [That’s right/Actually], a rock does not have a brain. 
 
  Would Alex say that a rock has a mind?  Yes  No 
  [That’s right/Actually], a rock does not have a mind. 
 
 
 Alex also saw a grown-up man. 
  Would Alex say that a grown-up man has a mind? Yes  No 
  [That’s right/Actually], a grown-up man does have a mind. 
 
  Would Alex say that a grown-up man has a brain? Yes  No 
  [That’s right/Actually], a grown-up man does have a brain. 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Great!  Let me show you how the game works.  What I want to do is read you Alex’s 
notes about the new people, animals and things that he saw and see if you can figure out 
which ones have a mind or a brain.  The tricky part of the game is that I don’t have all of 
Alex’s notes.  Some of them got lost.  So sometimes you’ll know enough to figure it out, 
but sometimes you won’t.  And that’s Ok, just tell me that you can’t tell. 
 
 You can answer my questions by saying Yes, No or that you Can’t Tell (point to 
yes, no and can’t tell on strip).  I want you to think really hard about what I tell you and 
the questions I ask you because sometimes, after you answer my question, I’ll ask you 
why you think that’s the answer.  That doesn’t mean your answer is right or wrong, I just 
want to know what you think.  Let’s try one so you can see what I mean. 
 
 [get Morp card]  We’ll start with a Morp.  Alex’s notes say that a Morp likes to touch 
things with its fingertips, it doesn’t have any legs and it’s sometimes noisy.  So, tell me…  
 
Do you think a Morp has fingers? Yes No Can’t Tell 
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[That’s right/Actually], a Morp does have fingers. 
Do you think a Morp has a tail? Yes No Can’t Tell 
[That’s right/Actually], we can’t tell whether a Morp has a tail. 
Do you think a Morp has knees? Yes No Can’t Tell 
[That’s right/Actually], a Morp does not have knees. 
What makes you think that?  How can you tell a Morp doesn’t have knees?  
[That’s right/Actually], we can tell a Morp doesn’t have knees because a Morp doesn’t 
have any legs. 
 
Ok great!  Let’s get started.  Now remember, your job is to try to figure out which ones 
have a mind or a brain. 
 
 [All the cards with the entity’s names should be randomized.  Write down the name of the 
entity for each question and use it in the blank areas.  The attribute statements should be 
read as if you are reading Alex’s notes.] 
 
1. Here’s a ______.  Alex’s notes say that _______s think about lots of things, they 
can feel happy and they often play with other ________s.   
Let me check to make sure you remember Alex’s notes. 
Memory Check Questions: [After each question, state the correct answer:  That’s 
right/Actually…] 
a. Do _______s never think about anything or do they think about lots of 
things?  
b. Can _______s feel happy or do they never feel happy?   
c. Do _______s always play alone or do they often play with other 
_______s?  
Test Questions:  So, tell me… 
d. Do you think a _______ has a heart? Yes No Can’t 
Tell 
e. Do you think a _______ is alive? Yes No Can’t 
Tell 
f. Do you think a _______ has a mind? Yes No Can’t 
Tell 
g. Do you think a _______ has a brain? Yes No Can’t 
Tell 
h. If you had to guess, would you say a _______  
is probably a person, an animal or a thing? Person Animal
 Thing 
 
2. Here’s a ______.  Alex’s notes say that _______s often play with other 
________s, they want lots of things and they can feel happy.   
Let me check to make sure you remember Alex’s notes. 
Memory Check Questions: [After each question, state the correct answer:  That’s 
right/Actually…] 
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a. Do _______s always play alone or do they often play with other 
_______s?  
b. Do _______s want lots of things or do they never want anything? 
c. Can _______s feel happy or do they never feel happy?   
Test Questions:  So, tell me… 
d. Do you think a _______ has a heart? Yes No Can’t 
Tell 
e. Do you think a _______ is alive? Yes No Can’t 
Tell 
f. Do you think a _______ has a brain? Yes No Can’t 
Tell 
g. Do you think a _______ has a mind? Yes No Can’t 
Tell 
h. If you had to guess, would you say a _______  
is probably a person, animal or thing? Person Animal
 Thing 
 
3. Here’s a ______.  Alex’s notes say that _______s are tall, they often play with 
other ________s and they can feel happy.   
Let me check to make sure you remember Alex’s notes. 
Memory Check Questions: [After each question, state the correct answer:  That’s 
right/Actually…] 
a. Are _______s short or are they tall?   
b. Do _______s always play alone or do they often play with other 
_______s?  
c. Can _______s feel happy or do they never feel happy?   
Test Questions:  So, tell me… 
d. Do you think a _______ has a heart? Yes No Can’t 
Tell 
e. Do you think a _______ is alive? Yes No Can’t 
Tell 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 Remember I told you that after some of my questions, I would ask you 
why you think that’s the answer?  I’m going to do that after my next 3 questions.  
Remember, that doesn’t mean that your answers are right or wrong.  I just want to 
know what you’re thinking.  Ok?  So, tell me… 
 
f. Do you think a _______ has a mind? Yes No Can’t 
Tell 
What makes you think that? _____________________________________ 
(How can you tell a ____ [has/doesn’t have]…/Why can’t you tell…) 
g. Do you think a _______ has a brain? Yes No Can’t 
Tell 
What makes you think that? _____________________________________ 
(How can you tell a ____ [has/doesn’t have]…/Why can’t you tell…) 
 94
h. If you had to guess, would you say a _______  
is probably a person, animal or thing? Person Animal
 Thing 
What makes you think that? _____________________________________ 
(How can you tell its probably a…) 
 
4. Here’s a ______.  Alex’s notes say that _______s can feel happy, they are heavy 
and they think about lots of things.   
Let me check to make sure you remember Alex’s notes. 
Memory Check Questions: [After each question, state the correct answer:  That’s 
right/Actually…] 
a. Can _______s feel happy or do they never feel happy?   
b. Are _______s heavy or are they light?   
c. Do _______s never think about anything or do they think about lots of 
things?  
Test Questions:  So, tell me… 
d. Do you think a _______ has a heart? Yes No Can’t 
Tell 
e. Do you think a _______ is alive? Yes No Can’t 
Tell 
f. Do you think a _______ has a brain? Yes No Can’t 
Tell 
g. Do you think a _______ has a mind? Yes No Can’t 
Tell 
h. If you had to guess, would you say a _______  
is probably a person, animal or thing? Person Animal
 Thing 
 
5. Here’s a ______.  Alex’s notes say that _______s want lots of things, they can 
feel happy and they are white.   
Let me check to make sure you remember Alex’s notes. 
Memory Check Questions: [After each question, state the correct answer:  That’s 
right/Actually…] 
a. Do _______s want lots of things or do they never want anything? 
b. Can _______s feel happy or do they never feel happy?   
c. Are _______s red or are they white?   
Test Questions:  So, tell me… 
d. Do you think a _______ has a heart? Yes No Can’t 
Tell 
e. Do you think a _______ is alive? Yes No Can’t 
Tell 
f. Do you think a _______ has a mind? Yes No Can’t 
Tell 
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g. Do you think a _______ has a brain? Yes No Can’t 
Tell 
h. If you had to guess, would you say a _______  
is probably a person, animal or thing? Person Animal Thing 
 
6. Here’s a ______.  Alex’s notes say that _______s can feel happy, they are often 
outside and they are medium sized.   
Let me check to make sure you remember Alex’s notes. 
Memory Check Questions: [After each question, state the correct answer:  That’s 
right/Actually…] 
a. Can _______s feel happy or do they never feel happy?   
b. Are _______s always inside or are they often outside?  
c. Are _______s really small or are they medium-sized? 
Test Questions:  So, tell me… 
d. Do you think a _______ has a heart? Yes No Can’t 
Tell 
e. Do you think a _______ is alive? Yes No Can’t 
Tell 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 Just like before, after my next 3 questions, I’m going to ask you why you 
think that’s the answer?  Remember, that doesn’t mean that your answers are 
right or wrong.  I just want to know what you’re thinking.  Ok?  So, tell me… 
 
f. Do you think a _______ has a brain? Yes No Can’t 
Tell 
What makes you think that? 
_____________________________________ 
(How can you tell a ____ [has/doesn’t have]…/Why can’t you 
tell…) 
g. Do you think a _______ has a mind? Yes No Can’t 
Tell 
What makes you think that? 
_____________________________________ 
(How can you tell a ____ [has/doesn’t have]…/Why can’t you 
tell…) 
h. If you had to guess, would you say a _______  
is probably a person, animal or thing? Person Animal
 Thing 
What makes you think that? 
_____________________________________ 
(How can you tell its probably a…) 
 
7. Here’s a ______.  Alex’s notes say that _______s often play with other 
________s, they think about lots of things and  they are medium sized.   
Let me check to make sure you remember Alex’s notes. 
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Memory Check Questions: [After each question, state the correct answer:  That’s 
right/Actually…] 
a. Do _______s always play alone or do they often play with other 
_______s?  
b. Do _______s never think about anything or do they think about lots of 
things?  
c. Are _______s really small or are they medium-sized? 
Test Questions:  So, tell me… 
d. Do you think a _______ has a heart? Yes No Can’t 
Tell 
e. Do you think a _______ is alive? Yes No Can’t 
Tell 
f. Do you think a _______ has a mind? Yes No Can’t 
Tell 
g. Do you think a _______ has a brain? Yes No Can’t 
Tell 
h. If you had to guess, would you say a _______  
is probably a person, animal or thing? Person Animal
 Thing 
 
8. Here’s a ______.  Alex’s notes say that _______s want lots of things, they are 
brown and they often play with other ________s.   
Let me check to make sure you remember Alex’s notes. 
Memory Check Questions: [After each question, state the correct answer:  That’s 
right/Actually…] 
a. Do _______s want lots of things or do they never want anything? 
b. Are _______s brown or are they green?   
c. Do _______s always play alone or do they often play with other 
_______s?  
Test Questions:  So, tell me… 
d. Do you think a _______ has a heart? Yes No Can’t 
Tell 
e. Do you think a _______ is alive? Yes No Can’t 
Tell 
f. Do you think a _______ has a brain? Yes No Can’t 
Tell 
g. Do you think a _______ has a mind? Yes No Can’t 
Tell 
h. If you had to guess, would you say a _______  
is probably a person, animal or thing? Person Animal
 Thing 
 
9. Here’s a ______.  Alex’s notes say that _______s are heavy, they often play with 
other ________s and they are often outside.   
Let me check to make sure you remember Alex’s notes. 
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Memory Check Questions: [After each question, state the correct answer:  That’s 
right/Actually…] 
a. Are _______s heavy or are they light?   
b. Do _______s always play alone or do they often play with other 
_______s?  
c. Are _______s always inside or are they often outside?  
Test Questions:  So, tell me… 
d. Do you think a _______ has a heart? Yes No Can’t 
Tell 




 Just like before, after my next 3 questions, I’m going to ask you why you 
think that’s the answer?  Remember, that doesn’t mean that your answers are 
right or wrong.  I just want to know what you’re thinking.  Ok?  So, tell me… 
 
f. Do you think a _______ has a mind? Yes No Can’t 
Tell 
What makes you think that? 
_____________________________________ 
(How can you tell a ____ [has/doesn’t have]…/Why can’t you 
tell…) 
g. Do you think a _______ has a brain? Yes No Can’t 
Tell 
What makes you think that? 
_____________________________________ 
(How can you tell a ____ [has/doesn’t have]…/Why can’t you 
tell…) 
h. If you had to guess, would you say a _______  
is probably a person, animal or thing? Person Animal
 Thing 
What makes you think that? 
_____________________________________ 
(How can you tell its probably a…) 
 
10. Here’s a ______.  Alex’s notes say that _______s think about lots of things, they  
are white and they are tall.  
Let me check to make sure you remember Alex’s notes. 
Memory Check Questions: [After each question, state the correct answer:  That’s 
right/Actually…] 
a. Do _______s never think about anything or do they think about lots of 
things?  
b. Are _______s red or are they white?  
c. Are _______s short or are they tall?  
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Test Questions:  So, tell me… 
d. Do you think a _______ has a heart? Yes No Can’t 
Tell 
e. Do you think a _______ is alive? Yes No Can’t 
Tell 
f. Do you think a _______ has a brain? Yes No Can’t 
Tell 
g. Do you think a _______ has a mind? Yes No Can’t 
Tell 
h. If you had to guess, would you say a _______  
is probably a person, animal or thing? Person Animal
 Thing 
 
11. Here’s a ______.  Alex’s notes say that _______s want lots of things, they are 
heavy and they are often outside.   
Let me check to make sure you remember Alex’s notes. 
Memory Check Questions: [After each question, state the correct answer:  That’s 
right/Actually…] 
a. Do _______s want lots of things or do they never want anything? 
b. Are _______s heavy or are they light?   
c. Are _______s always inside or are they often outside?  
Test Questions:  So, tell me… 
d. Do you think a _______ has a heart? Yes No Can’t 
Tell 
e. Do you think a _______ is alive? Yes No Can’t 
Tell 
f. Do you think a _______ has a mind? Yes No Can’t 
Tell 
g. Do you think a _______ has a brain? Yes No Can’t 
Tell 
h. If you had to guess, would you say a _______  
is probably a person, animal or thing? Person Animal
 Thing 
 
12. Here’s a ______.  Alex’s notes say that _______s are medium sized, they are 
brown and they are tall.   
Let me check to make sure you remember Alex’s notes. 
Memory Check Questions: [After each question, state the correct answer:  That’s 
right/Actually…] 
a. Are _______s really small or are they medium-sized? 
b. Are _______s brown or are they green?  
c. Are _______s short or are they tall?   
Test Questions:  So, tell me… 
d. Do you think a _______ has a heart? Yes No Can’t 
Tell 
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 Just like before, after my next 3 questions, I’m going to ask you why you 
think that’s the answer?  Remember, that doesn’t mean that your answers are 
right or wrong.  I just want to know what you’re thinking.  Ok?  So, tell me… 
 
f. Do you think a _______ has a brain? Yes No Can’t 
Tell 
What makes you think that? 
_____________________________________ 
(How can you tell a ____ [has/doesn’t have]…/Why can’t you 
tell…) 
g. Do you think a _______ has a mind? Yes No Can’t 
Tell 
What makes you think that? 
_____________________________________ 
(How can you tell a ____ [has/doesn’t have]…/Why can’t you 
tell…) 
h. If you had to guess, would you say a _______  
is probably a person, animal or thing? Person Animal
 Thing 
What makes you think that? 
_____________________________________ 
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